5
paper concludes with some brief reflections on how to refine and extend the analysis
presented below.
2. Impartiality and Commitment Problems: Theory & Hypotheses
According to the commitment problem explanation for war, military contests can result
from disputants’ inability to make a credible pledge not to renege on a bargain that, if
enforceable, would be mutually preferable to war.
7
Although commitment problems can arise under a variety of empirical conditions,
recent scholarship suggests that they assume special virulence in cases of intrastate
conflict.
8
Unlike dueling states, combatants in intrastate conflicts must agree to
demobilize or disarm and submit to a joint political authority at the end of the war.
Although necessary in order to make the transition from war to peace, this process is
inherently fraught with problems of credible commitment. This is perhaps most obvious
in the case of demobilization and disarmament, where successful defection – e.g., in the
form of a surprise attack on a faithfully demobilizing enemy – can potentially threaten the
very survival of the party that finds itself on the receiving end of such opportunistic
behavior. Problems of credible commitment often lurk at the political level as well,
however, especially in cases where peace agreements fail to provide the weaker side with
7
Cf. Fearon 1995, 401-09; 1998; as well as Walter 1997; 1999; and 2002.
8
Among others, see Rothchild and Lake 1998, 218-19; and Walter 1997; 1999; and 2002. Fearon
1995, 401-09 outlines a number of scenarios under which commitment problems can emerge at the
interstate level. For a sophisticated critique of the causal logic underlying the commitment problem
explanation for war, see Gartzke 1999, 571-73. Even Gartzke, however, acknowledges that the
argument posseses plausibility in the context of intrastate disputes.
Convention