19
On the other hand, one can still conclude that the anger of the populist citizen,
however understandable, is a danger to democratic stability that still needs to be
contained. His liberal counterpart on this view, whatever his flaws, is still a preferable.
The populist we might learn to live with but he is still hardly admirable nor worthy of
imitation. Is there, nevertheless, any more room for populist anger in democratic theory?
One approach is to examine Martha Nussbaum’s counsel. Nussbaum has recently urged
us to reconsider the role of emotion in moral and political life. In her Upheavals of
Thought (2001), she advocates cultivating an appreciation of what it is like to suffer great
misfortune. Those who suffer great loss such as the death of loved ones, serious illness or
great poverty through no fault of their own elicit a universal sense of compassion from
others. While there are circumstances that might lead us be less emotionally tied to those
who suffer great misfortune such as a misplaced sense of responsibility, Nussbaum
believes that education that teaches what it is like to experience calamities can create a
more inclusive sense of citizenship. She thus suggests instruction in classical Greek
tragedy and blues music as way to sensitize Americans to the universality of suffering.
It is probably unlikely that Nussbaum would agree that it desirable for citizens to
sympathize with populist anger.
ix
Her case for centering emotion in moral and political
discourse is framed very cautiously. Moreover, she is reticent to recommend including
other emotions, particularly disgust and shame, in reaching moral and political judgments
(342-50). Possibly attempts to understand anger and its related emotions in others is
likely to fail or produce undesirable consequences. Will the appreciation lead to a
abdication of judgment in regard to the objects of another’s anger? Will it “wear off” on
the sympathetic observer? Will it produce a sense of superiority? Each of these dangers,
Convention