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citizens. Victor Peale (1989), for example, notes the parallel use of anti-semitism in
nineteenth century German and American populist movements and Michael Kazin
wonders if “populism too easily becomes a language of the dispirited, the vengeful, the
cynical—of young men spoiling for a fight and of candidates with more cleverness than
conviction” (1993, 283).
On the basis of this brief review one could conclude that the definitional problems
of populism are intimately related to populism’s close resemblances to modern
democratic politics itself. Every feature identified by students of populism is also a
widely held practice in modern democracies. Thus the skittishness with which populism
is approached can be a consequence of fear of democracy in general or at least a fear of a
“hyper” version of democracy. It is also possible that concern about populism rests with
the relative weight that particular populist moments assign to the features we have noted.
Many students of populism, however, implicitly or explicitly are anxious about the
consequences of incorporating anger as a primary basis of political action. Is anger and
its closely related emotions of resentment, rage, revenge and envy a desirable, or even
acceptable, foundation for political change? Are these emotions themselves responsible
for populism’s uneven accomplishments in regard to questions surrounding issues of
toleration? Are these feelings also a possible source of the record of failure despite the
proliferation of populist moments? Are the two faces of populism—one xenophobic,
racist, prone to accepting demagogues and extra-constitutional measures—the other—
decent, humane, innovative and communitarian, also the consequences of the two faces
of anger—one that seeks to build and one that seeks to destroy?
Convention