3
of the planter-class’ wealth and influence (Klein 1986). What made Cuba unusual was
that this concern about the risks of political agitation was joined to an economy still
dependent on slave labor. This resulted in the defection of creole support for
independence.
While the Cuban example seems to suggest an outcome that diverges from the
Anderson model, I believe that the outcome is consistent with Anderson’s claims if one
adopts a more flexible analytical perspective. Anderson recognized that creole
nationalism sought to build support for independence while carefully avoiding the type of
mobilization that might produce unmanageable popular uprisings in the time period after
national autonomy was secured. Creole nationalism can be identified by its social
thinness (Anderson 1991). Cuba was different than the rest of Spanish America, because
its war of independence, as it emerged in its historically specific form, was socially
‘thick’ (Ferrer 1999). The movement was carried forward not by a thin ripple of popular
muscle, set in motion by elite provocateurs, but by wide-spread discontent among a
population of color with access to material and cultural resources. As the war for
liberation developed force and direction, more and more people of color became
involved, and they increasingly held positions of authority and consequence in the
rebellion. The threat of an uprising by people of color, therefore, was identified with
independence, not with the prolonged rule of Spain. Given the choice between a
mobilized population of color seeking a place of equality in a new civic union or
continuation of Spanish rulers, on-going Spanish rule seemed preferable to a large
number of creole elites.
Convention