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The SNP, reluctant to be drawn into a “devolutionist trap” and preferring to use its new electoral
momentum to push for independence, stayed out and was showered with criticism for spurning
the cross-party, civil society group (Mitchell 1996:234-243). "The Convention was a curious
combination of rhetoric about a renewal of democracy with a continuation of the semi-secretive
world of the committees and boards that had run the Scottish welfare state. There was some
reality to the claims that the Convention represented a broad spectrum of Scottish society...but it
was also socially narrow and very traditional in its composition and style" (Paterson and Wyn
Jones 1999:180). That is why it is useful as an indicator and might have been important as a
catalyst.
All this happened despite the evident weaknesses of the Constitutional Convention,
which was, as Mitchell points out, “unprepared for the most likely outcome of the 1992
election,” namely, Conservative victory (Mitchell 1996:287). The SCC might not have
galvanized Scots or even made itself known to them, but it did certify elite resistance and
territorial politics as legitimate, and autonomy as a goal many Scottish regional organizations
actively now wanted. It made it clear and public that regionalization could supply autonomy
without being a creature of the destabilizing SNP. It appointed a committee of well-known
academics to produce a draft of a devolution act, chose an eminent churchman for a chair (the
choice, Canon Kenyon Wright, was also well-connected in England, which helped stop
accusations of anti-Englishness). Its devolutionist proposals initially came out on 30 November
1990. They were studiously practical and basically spoke of self-government over competencies
already devolved to the Scottish Office.
This was an appealing menu for regional organizations whose chief complaint was
already, and would increasingly be, the intervention of the central state in their affairs. By 1990
they were already in the throes of the poll tax, NHS reform, utilities privatization, and law
reform, all imposed from London; this elite-backed, moderate devolution proposal was a good
solution that promised them all autonomy and stability together. The consequence affected
public opinion by supplying an anti-centralist explanation for policies the public disliked and
easing campaigns against the various high-profile policies such as the poll tax and the local
government reform. The press joined in, with the Scotsman especially interested (it sponsored a
dramatic debate in Edinburgh that raised the temperature and forced parties to respond) (Smith,
M. 1994). Above all, though, it made devolution not just a respectable but a favored strategy for
regional organizations seeking autonomy. The list of participants included 56 local authority
representatives, 21 party representatives, 23 trades unionists, and participants from the Dundee
Chamber of Commerce, the Law Society/Faculty of Advocates (the main legal organizations),
Convention