Author's Keywords: Judicial politics, Judicial behavior, new institutionalism, constitutional law	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62006_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Mohammad-Zadeh, Katayoun. "The Limits of Judicial Modeling: Comparing Theories of Judicial Decision-Making in Separation of Powers Cases" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62006_index.html>

Mohammad-Zadeh, K. , 2003-08-27 "The Limits of Judicial Modeling: Comparing Theories of Judicial Decision-Making in Separation of Powers Cases" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p62006_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Very few theories of Supreme Court decisionmaking offer explanations of the Court's opinions in separation of powers cases. My research attempts to address this omission in the literature by using separation of powers cases to test the explanatory and predictive power of four different approaches to Supreme Court decisionmaking: the attitudinal model, the "strategic" approach, ruling-coalition theory, and historical new institutionalism. The study hypothesizes that historical new institutionalist approaches are in the best position to explain the outcomes in these cases. As a test of this hypothesis, I am analyzing all significant separation of powers cases decided by the Rehnquist Court. Attitudinal models fail to explain why justices of widely different ideological preferences vote along the same lines in these cases. The strategic model would predict that the justices would support those institutions that are controlled by people with attitudes that are most closely aligned with the Court majority, but this turns out not to be the case. The theory of ruling coalitions suggests that the Court's decisions will reflect the preferences of dominant ruling coalitions, but the data suggests either that this is not consistently true or that separation-of-powers cases fall outside the scope of the model because they reflect divisions among dominant coalitions. Instead, the preliminary results demonstrate that the justices' behavior is most consistent with that which we would expect from an historical new institutionalist analysis. There is evidence that justices form endogenous preferences based on the structure of constitutional doctrine, and that these preferences are not reducible to the sort of conventional policy preferences measured by attitudinalists. Moreover, in these cases the justices also appear to be pursuing a distinctive institutional mission related to the maintenance of judicial power and a system of checks and balances; the outcomes in these cases do not suggest that the justices are stealthily promoting conventional policy preferences. I will examine the question of whether separation of powers cases expose limits to prevailing models of judicial behavior, and also the question of what new institutionalist analysis can contribute to our understanding of Supreme Court politics.

Contres, the Court and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Can "Liberal" Originalist Constitutional Theory Help Us Explain the Supreme Court as an Institution in American Political Development?