Author's Keywords: corruption, BEEPS, transition economies, clientelism, economic reform, political patronage, patron-client, business-firm relations, privatization	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64185_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Van Loo, Jonathan. "Political Clientelism and the Political Economy of Corruption in Transition Economies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 27, 2003 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64185_index.html>

Van Loo, J. , 2003-08-27 "Political Clientelism and the Political Economy of Corruption in Transition Economies" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64185_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Using the BEEPS survey of about 4000 firms in transition economies developed by the World Bank and the EBRD, this paper tests hypotheses concerning the causes of the political behavior of firms in transition economies. The evidence supports the hypothesis that clientelist relations between firms and the state, which have been shown to have detrimental effects on economic growth and income equality elsewhere in the world, exist in many transition economies. The results suggest that the corruption and crony capitalism observed in many transition countries is generated by firms and state officials who find themselves involved in an interdependent political and economic relationship. In a system of political clientelism, firms provide political support to politicians, and in exchange politicians distribute economic benefits to client firms. High-level corruption in transition economies is generated by personalistic, hierarchical, asymmetrical, clientelist links between firms and government officials rather than the lobbying activity of pressure groups acting on a weak state. Ordered logit analysis of the determinants of firm overdue payments, or payment arrears, shows that large, privatized firms hold higher payment arrears in clientelist countries, while these factors have no impact on arrears in countries with low levels of clientelism. The evidence suggests that the extent of political clientelism has a major impact on corruption and economic policy, regardless of the extent of private ownership in the economy. This analysis of the political behavior of firms and the economic policy environment has important policy implications for all countries implementing market-oriented economic reform and attempting to reduce corruption. Questions concerning the treatment of state-owned versus privatized firms in clientelist countries will be pursued in further research.

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