Author's Keywords: Constitutional choice, Electoral formulas, Presidential elections, Military rulers, Political Parties, Multipartism, Latin America	Convention Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: Southern Political Science Association URL: http://www.spsa.net
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67607_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Negretto, Gabriel. "Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers and Presidential Elections in Latin America" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Inter-Continental Hotel, New Orleans, LA, Jan 08, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67607_index.html>

Negretto, G. , 2004-01-08 "Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers and Presidential Elections in Latin America" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Inter-Continental Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67607_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: The electoral formulas to choose presidents differ in the degree they restrict the number of parties competing in presidential elections. While simple plurality rule tends toward two-party competitions, qualified plurality and majority rule tends toward multi-party contests for the presidency. This article argues that the bargaining power and the electoral expectations of the political actors with control over constitutional design explain the choice of these rules. Using this analytic framework, the article shows that the recent shift in Latin America from plurality to more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections reflects the risk-averse choice of multiparty assemblies and military rulers. The explanation is supported with data on 35 cases of major constitutional reforms in 18 countries of Latin America and with the study of the most recent reforms in Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentina.

For Men Only? Party System Development, Electoral Reform and the Election of Women to Russian Regional Assemblies

Unique and Common Factors Influencing a Citizen-Driven Electoral Reform Proposal: Electoral Systems and Governance Choices in the British Columbian Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform