Author's Keywords: Congressional Elections, Dynamic Models, Voter Decision Making, Money	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: Southern Political Science Association URL: http://www.spsa.net
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67694_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

McClurg, Scott. "Dollar for Dollar: The Effect of Strategic Incumbent Spending on Voter Decision Making" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Inter-Continental Hotel, New Orleans, LA, Jan 08, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67694_index.html>

McClurg, S. , 2004-01-08 "Dollar for Dollar: The Effect of Strategic Incumbent Spending on Voter Decision Making" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Inter-Continental Hotel, New Orleans, LA Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67694_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: In Congressional elections, incumbent candidates possess a number of advantages over their opponents. Considering the sizeable gap in their ability to raise and spend funds, money is often assumed to be one of those advantages. However, scholarly research provides mixed evidence on the effects of spending by incumbent candidates in competitive elections, especially at the individual level. This paper develops a dynamic model of how the information available to the electorate responds to different spending strategies by Congressional candidates. The logic of this model implies that the main effect of incumbent spending is to reduce the marginal effect of challenger spending. This hypothesis is confirmed by analysis based on the data originally used by Jacobson (1990) in opening up inquiry on this topic at the individual level. Additional implications of the theoretical model are discussed in the conclusion.

Voters’ Motivation and Information Processing: A Model of Motivated Information Processing in a Political Campaign

Candidate Gender as an Information Shortcut: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of Political Environments

The Effect of Candidate and Voter's Race on Voter's Evaluations Under Varying Information Environments: Evidence from an Experiment