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Association: Name: International Studies Association URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69960_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Jungblut, Bernadette., Agress, Renee. and Lektzian, David. "The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Internal Conflict: The Capacity and Preferences of Domestic Groups in Target States" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69960_index.html>

Jungblut, B. M., Agress, R. B. and Lektzian, D. , 2005-03-05 "The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Internal Conflict: The Capacity and Preferences of Domestic Groups in Target States" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii Online <PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69960_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Policymakers have turned to the use of economic sanctions with such frequency in the post cold war era, that they have been described as virtually the default option in American foreign policy (Selden, 1999: 3). However, there is still relatively little known about how economic costs imposed on the target country should translate into the policy change desired by the sender nation. The conventional wisdom regarding sanctions is that economic costs imposed on citizens of target states will lead to their dissatisfaction with the regime's policies, and eventually citizens will rise up and pressure their government into making the changes demanded by the sender or facing removal from office by election or force, if necessary. In this view, the greater the burden placed on innocent citizens, the more likely the sanctions will lead to a policy change. While we have some evidence that suggests success is more likely to be achieved when sanctions impose high economic costs on the target (Drury 1998, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, Tsebelis 1990, Morgan and Schwebach 1997), we have a very incomplete picture of the specific consequences of economic sanctions for different domestic groups in target states. We also have little understanding of these groups' responses to externally imposed sanctions. Our paper proposes to fill this void in the literature by developing and testing theoretical expectations about the causal sequence leading from the external imposition of economic sanctions to the response of the target states' domestic constituencies' (rallying 'round the flag versus protest behaviors including strikes, demonstrations, riots, and civil war), and then on to eventual (or not) policy and/or regime change. Thus, this paper accomplishes three primary goals. First, the paper provides an improved understanding of the actual impacts of sanctions on target states' domestic constituencies. Second, the paper provides a more thorough explication and categorization of these domestic groups and their responses to economic sanctions. Finally, the paper provides recommendations for re-designing economic sanctions to target those segments of society both desirous and capable of inducing policy and/or regime change.

Economic Sanction Effectiveness to Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in the Target Countries: Sanctions Onset, Macroeconomic Policy, and Political Stability

The Effects of Economic Sanctions on Internal Conflict: The Capacity and Preferences of Domestic Groups in Target States