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The United States, the International Criminal Court, and Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Explaining the Resistance of Weak States and Consequences for American Foreign Policy |
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Abstract:
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The United States has adopted a number of measures to ensure that their citizens are not subject to the International Criminal Court. Most significantly, the Bush administration has used economic sanctions such as the termination of economic and military aid in order to coerce states to sign bilateral immunity agreements (BIA). These agreements exempt Americans from prosecution by the ICC. In many cases, this tactic has proven effective. Over ninety states have signed such agreements. However, the decision by many Latin American and small Caribbean states to refuse to sign a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States in the face of intense opposition from the United States is remarkable.
This paper first addresses why these states have refused to sign an agreement in the face of intense pressure. International Relations theory has difficulty accounting for states that act in ways that are contrary to their material interests. Despite what the major theories of International Relations would tell us to expect, these states make these choices because they are seeking more abstract goals. Prestige is one of those goals and, in the case of the International Criminal Court examined in this paper, explains why some small Caribbean states were willing to sacrifice their immediate security and economic objectives to support the Court.
Second, this paper examines whether continued pressure by the United States in the form of aid termination is worth the costs it is imposing on other American foreign policy goals. In particular, the potential harm to US anti-narcotic efforts, democracy goals, and overall security is substantial. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
state (224), intern (105), caribbean (81), aid (77), court (77), us (77), unit (73), sign (70), icc (68), agreement (61), countri (60), american (57), polici (56), foreign (55), trinidad (53), secur (51), 2004 (51), tobago (48), prestig (47), econom (45), u.s (41), |
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Association:
Name: International Studies Association URL: http://www.isanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Wylie, Lana. "The United States, the International Criminal Court, and Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Explaining the Resistance of Weak States and Consequences for American Foreign Policy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69961_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Wylie, L. L. , 2005-03-05 "The United States, the International Criminal Court, and Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Explaining the Resistance of Weak States and Consequences for American Foreign Policy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p69961_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: The United States has adopted a number of measures to ensure that their citizens are not subject to the International Criminal Court. Most significantly, the Bush administration has used economic sanctions such as the termination of economic and military aid in order to coerce states to sign bilateral immunity agreements (BIA). These agreements exempt Americans from prosecution by the ICC. In many cases, this tactic has proven effective. Over ninety states have signed such agreements. However, the decision by many Latin American and small Caribbean states to refuse to sign a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States in the face of intense opposition from the United States is remarkable.
This paper first addresses why these states have refused to sign an agreement in the face of intense pressure. International Relations theory has difficulty accounting for states that act in ways that are contrary to their material interests. Despite what the major theories of International Relations would tell us to expect, these states make these choices because they are seeking more abstract goals. Prestige is one of those goals and, in the case of the International Criminal Court examined in this paper, explains why some small Caribbean states were willing to sacrifice their immediate security and economic objectives to support the Court.
Second, this paper examines whether continued pressure by the United States in the form of aid termination is worth the costs it is imposing on other American foreign policy goals. In particular, the potential harm to US anti-narcotic efforts, democracy goals, and overall security is substantial. |
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| Document Type: |
.PDF |
| Page count: |
35 |
| Word count: |
10864 |
| Text sample: |
| The United States the International Criminal Court and Bilateral Immunity Agreements: Explaining the Resistance of Weak States and Consequences for American Foreign Policy Lana Wylie Yale University lana.wylie@yale.edu Abstract The United States has adopted a number of measures to ensure that their citizens are not subject to the International Criminal Court. Most significantly the Bush administration has used economic sanctions such as the termination of economic and military aid in order to coerce states to sign bilateral immunity agreements |
| and US foreign policy in order to take into consideration important variables in the international system that will produce otherwise unexpected results. The use of aid in an attempt to coerce compliance has already had negative consequences both for the economic and security prospects of the affected states and for other U.S. foreign policy goals. The frank recognition that Wylie 34 other variables are important to states would enable U.S. policymakers to better avoid instituting policies that both harm |
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