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American Unilateralism and Korean Nationalism: Understanding Forward-deployed and Host Nation Cooperation

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Abstract:

This paper constructs two models for examining the strategic interaction between a state maintaining forward-deployed forces and a state hosting foreign troops. These models focus on internal and external shocks to security relations, which in the case of the United States and Republic of Korea, largely equate to incidents involving the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the degree of threat posed by North Korea. The primary approach is a computer-simulated dynamic model dealing with stocks of security/political costs and benefits, the levels of which are determined by a system of differential equations. The alternate method presented is a game theoretic approach with mixed strategies. Both models seek to explain variation in South Korean nationalist and supportive alliance behavior and American unilateralist and cooperative action. The models show it is not surprising to witness US unilateralism or wavering ROK commitment, and that while the partnership may be strained, the US-ROK alliance is highly durable. However, the models suggest that to effectively deal with North Korea, Seoul needs to manage Korean nationalism, and to cooperatively improve the security environment, Washington needs to limit American unilateralism. Addressing these concerns requires an understanding of the mechanisms behind forward-deployed and host nation cooperation, which this paper aims to provide by examining the impact of SOFA incidents and the North Korean threat on US-ROK strategic interaction.
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Name: International Studies Association
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http://www.isanet.org


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URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71697_index.html
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MLA Citation:

"American Unilateralism and Korean Nationalism: Understanding Forward-deployed and Host Nation Cooperation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, Mar 05, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71697_index.html>

APA Citation:

, 2005-03-05 "American Unilateralism and Korean Nationalism: Understanding Forward-deployed and Host Nation Cooperation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71697_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper constructs two models for examining the strategic interaction between a state maintaining forward-deployed forces and a state hosting foreign troops. These models focus on internal and external shocks to security relations, which in the case of the United States and Republic of Korea, largely equate to incidents involving the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the degree of threat posed by North Korea. The primary approach is a computer-simulated dynamic model dealing with stocks of security/political costs and benefits, the levels of which are determined by a system of differential equations. The alternate method presented is a game theoretic approach with mixed strategies. Both models seek to explain variation in South Korean nationalist and supportive alliance behavior and American unilateralist and cooperative action. The models show it is not surprising to witness US unilateralism or wavering ROK commitment, and that while the partnership may be strained, the US-ROK alliance is highly durable. However, the models suggest that to effectively deal with North Korea, Seoul needs to manage Korean nationalism, and to cooperatively improve the security environment, Washington needs to limit American unilateralism. Addressing these concerns requires an understanding of the mechanisms behind forward-deployed and host nation cooperation, which this paper aims to provide by examining the impact of SOFA incidents and the North Korean threat on US-ROK strategic interaction.

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