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Association: Name: International Studies Association URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72799_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Chui, James. "China in the Post-September 11 World: The Hong Kong Policy of the People's Republic of China" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72799_index.html>

Chui, J. , 2004-03-17 "China in the Post-September 11 World: The Hong Kong Policy of the People's Republic of China" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72799_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper examines the Hong Kong (HK) policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-September 11 world. It is divided into six section: first the PRC policy towards HK prior to 1997 when the PRC resumed the exercise of sovereignty over HK; second, the policy goals and strategies pursued in achieving these goals since 1997; third, the policy outcomes and the situation of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) today; fourth, the domestic and international factors affecting the PRC policy; fifth, the prospects and policy options open to China; and sixth, conclusions. When the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stopped at the border in 1949 at the time the PRC was established, the PRC took a calculated step to allow Britain to keep HK as a colony. PRC’s policy then was “long-term calculation, full utilisation”. HK became an important window to the outside world when China was looking inward. HK took on special significance when the PRC embarked on an open door policy in 1979 that saw the PRC’s world revolution rhetoric giving way to the pragmatism of economic modernisation. Under the “One Country, Two Systems” (1C2S) principle, the Central Government (CG) provides HK with a high degree of autonomy, HK people administering HK, and “fifty years no change” for its social and economic systems. The policy goals after the transition are three-fold: first, prosperity (the economics); second, stability (the politics); and third, reunification (Taiwan). There are two aspects to prosperity, insofar as China continuing to use HK to promote its own economic development, including raising capital from HK and overseas, and insofar as China supporting HK’s economic wellbeing. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and a general slow down of the economy of the United States (US) hit HK badly. Unemployment was at a record high. China’s increased opening to the world has unintended consequences for HK, which sees it middleman role between China and the world dwindling. In support of HK’s economy, the CG undertook a number of measures, including signing its first free trade arrangement with HKSAR, and liberalising mainlanders’ travel to HK. On the politics, CG has given Tung Chee-hwa, HKSAR’s first Chief Executive (CE), total support. Despite his unpopularity in HK, where polls repeatedly found Mainland leaders, like Premier Zhu, very popular, he was re-appointed for a second term. Beijing feared that HK would become a base of subversion on the Mainland after a million HK people marched at the time of the Tiananmen events in 1989. Half a million people marched on 1 July 2003 against certain aspects of the draft national security bill required under Article 23 of the Basic Law, the mini-constitution for HKSAR, which were deemed unduly restrictive on freedom and liberty of HK citizens. The draft bill had to be withdrawn. On reunification with Taiwan, the 1C2S idea was actually designed for Taiwan, and HKSAR was supposed to show Taiwan the way and that it works. However, there was a dissonance, or a disconnect between the PRC’s HK and Taiwan’s policy. Much of Taiwan’s political spectrum has never accepted the 1C2S, and the problems after about seven years of HK under Chinese rule have exacerbated their concerns. President Chen Siu-bian of Taiwan declared, “We don’t want Taiwan to be a second Hong Kong.” United front strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entails waging the broadest front that unites all those who can be united in order to focus on the primary contradiction. Instead, the narrow political base of Tung, comprising primarily of business interests and traditional pro-China elements, plus his ineptness led to an ineffective government. The middle-class is alienated. The lower class suffers most, as the poor gets poorer. Moreover, Beijing’s increasing presence in HK’s politics since the turn of the century has made things worse. The Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), the pro-China party in HK, was trounced in the recent local district elections. The PRC’s united front work in HK since 1997 has failed. After six years of Chinese rule, there is a departure from the long-standing pre-transition policy of “long-term calculation, full utilisation” to a situation today which could be described as “short-sighted calculation, some utilisation”, as HK becomes less important economically to a China that is deepening and broadening its international economic exchanges. Factors affecting PRC’s HK policy may be considered under two heads: domestic and international. CCP’s penchant for control and fear of chaos colour what it thought is good for the Mainland and for HK. The pace and nature of change of the CCP is a key factor affecting changes in HK. The CCP’s obsession to hold onto power will drive PRC's HK policy, and will restrain the pace of HK’s democratic reforms. Nonetheless, the CCP does not exist in a vacuum. It needs to respond to centre-periphery (provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, and SARS) relations, as the constituent units are gaining more space. Society at large, including the market and civil society, which do not have much influence over Beijing at this time, will grow in significance. The increasing incoming inequalities within China would exacerbate conflicts within China, even though the new leaders are trying to do more for the peasants. How the democratic forces in HK would engage China would greatly affect Beijing. The March 2004 visit of HK legislators, including Martin Lee, to the US Senate was strongly condemned by Beijing as provocative. Likewise, the recent visit by Emily Lau of Frontier, another legislator who supports “self-determination” of the people of Taiwan, to Taiwan was also roundly criticized by Beijing for supporting “Taiwan independence.” The outcome of the 20 March 2004 elections in Taiwan is likely to affect Beijing’s HK policy. Insofar as the international community is concerned, the US has consistently supported freedom and liberty in HK, in the light of the US Hong Kong Policy Act. However, Beijing sees this as interference in China’s domestic affairs. In the post-September 11 world, China’s aspires to a multi-polar world with a peace under which it can continue its quest for economic development, and assume what it regards as its rightful place in the world. Two factors will constrain Beijing’s hands over HK. First, the increasing integration of China into the world economy will be a brake on how hard Beijing could hit HK when there will be repercussions, including capital flight. However, significant as international factors are, they would not be sufficient to determine Beijing’s policy, as was evidenced by Tiananmen. Second, using a stick against HK will render Beijing’s talk of offering Taiwan the carrot even emptier, thereby undercutting the 1C2S principle. Indeed, the 1C2S principle is profound. Even though Beijing has not deliberately sought to undermine it, its implementation in HK was at fault. For Beijing’s policy options, there can be two extreme poles. A draconian, unthinkable option is to declare martial law in HK should the local PLA garrison fail to contain disturbances, or to abrogate the Basic Law (BL) that provides the legal basis for HKSAR. The democratic forces, spearheaded by the Democratic Party (DP), which has been sidelined by Beijing since they supported the demonstrators at Tiananmen, are likely to do well at the September 2004 Legislative Council (Legco) elections. Should the democratic forces capture the Legco, one option is for the CE to dissolve the Legco. However, the utility of this option is limited, because fresh election needs to be called within three months, and the same people might be returned. Moreover, the CE can only do it once. At the other pole, the most liberal option is to accept the common call for direct election of the CE in 2007 and of the Legco in 2008, both of which are not disallowed in the BL. The advantage of this is to avoid the current political confrontation, so HK may be able to concentrate its mind to the task of economic recovery. Beijing has mistakenly diagnosed that people in HK are unhappy because of the economic malaise, without recognising that people are not happy also because their legitimate aspirations for “Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong” are being curbed. Yet this option is highly unlikely, since the CCP, notwithstanding a seemingly more open fourth generation of leaders, will not be prepared to go this far. Moreover vested interests in HK will not like to have their privileged position weakened. What is more likely is a policy outcome that is in between these two poles, reflecting a balance of power between the Mainland with its adherents in HK and the democratic forces. The US, which has an interest in HK, is likely to continue giving verbal support only. In conclusion, it may be pertinent to ask: Has the HK policy of the PRC failed? It would not be fair to say categorically that Beijing has totally failed. HK ranked number 1 on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom Index, and number 26 on the 2003 United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index (second only to Japan in Asia). Despite signs of rolling back of liberty, the media continue to be freewheeling, demonstrations occur almost daily, and even the Falun Gong, banned on the Mainland as an evil cult, is legally registered in HK, and still could organize public events. This paper concludes that there is a mixed picture insofar as the attainment of the three policy goals in relation to economics, politics and reunification. For economics, Beijing continues to benefit from HK, but its reliance on HK is decreasing, as other coastal areas are increasingly taking away HK’s middleman role, and as Beijing learns to engage the global economy on its own. For politics, its united front work since 1997 has failed. Unduly restraining HK may prove damaging to both. Beijing, fearing a too rapid pace of reform in HK will spill over onto the Mainland, holds that political reforms in HK should be gradual. Yet this paper asserts that direct elections in 2007/2008 are not likely to rock the boat. The fear that HK would become a base of subversion or ungovernable is being exaggerated by certain vested interests. A calculated assessment of the risks and opportunities should be made with vision. Concerning reunification with Taiwan, Beijing has failed miserably in using HK as an example. Its failure to win the hearts and minds of the people of HK is alienating what Beijing call compatriots in Taiwan where many are increasingly developing a separate Taiwan identity, thereby making the prospects of a peaceful reunification even more difficult. With HK already a done deal, this may yet be the worse failure.

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