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Association: Name: International Studies Association URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73219_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Hawkins, Darren., Nielson, Daniel. and Tierney, Michael. "Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73219_index.html>

Hawkins, D. , Nielson, D. and Tierney, M. J. , 2004-03-17 "Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73219_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Why do governments create IOs and delegate tasks and authority to them rather than merely act unilaterally or cooperate without delegating? Once created, how (and how successfully) can IOs be controlled? What features of IOs generate opportunities for independence from member governments? More generally, how can we understand the delegation relationship between governments and international organizations? This paper introduces these problems and offers some initial definitions and arguments. We define delegation as a conditional grant of authority by a Principal to an Agent to act on its behalf. The grant is limited by time or scope and is revocable by the principal. We identify seven reasons why states delegate to IOs rather than pursue alternatives such as unilateral action or multilateral cooperation without delegation. We also discuss various control mechanisms used by principals and we analyze the problems of agent slack.

Locating Authority: Domestic Politics and Delegation to International Institutions

Principal Control or Agent Autonomy? States and the Delegation of Authority to International Organizations

Delegating powers at the state level: Explaining the institutional designs of independent regulatory agencies in Brazil