15
•
NUMBER is the total number of candidates competing in the single-member district
minus one for the focal candidate. I expect
β
5
to be negative.
•
DID is a variable for the percentage of the district that is densely inhabited.
•
OWN CPS is the amount of campaign-period spending per elector for the focal candidate.
I expect
β
7
to be positive.
•
RIVAL CPS is the amount of campaign-period spending per elector for the focal
candidates’ main rival. I expect
β
8
to be negative.
•
OWN FUND, OWN PARTY and OWN KOENKAI are the year-based expenditures per
elector of the focal candidate for the fund agent, party branch, and other support groups,
whereas RIVAL FUND, RIVAL PARTY, and RIVAL KOENKAI are the expenditures
for the focal candidates’ main rival. I expect
β
9
through
β
11
to be positive and
β
12
through
β
14
to be negative.
8. Empirical Results for the LDP and DPJ
I present the empirical results for the LDP in Table 2. I use Models I, II and III to
separate the effects of campaign-period and year-based expenditures on LDP vote shares.
Model I shows the effects of own and rival campaign-period expenditures on LDP vote
shares. Own campaign-period expenditures have a small and statistically significant
effect of 8% of the district vote share for an increase in spending of ¥100 ($.94) per
elector (or 0.08 for ¥1). This indicates LDP members would need to spend about ¥33.9
million ($320,000) to see a boost of 8% in their vote share. In contrast, rival campaign-
period expenditures do not appear to have any systematic impact on the number of votes
LDP candidates received.
Convention