5
of the party’s PR lists.
4
Finally, candidates may be listed purely in the PR tier, and
acquire a seat if their ranking on the PR list is within the number of seats allocated to
their party for the regional block.
In mixed-member majoritarian systems that allow candidates to compete in both
tiers, the SMD contests can simultaneously advance the interests of individual candidates
and parties. The campaigns of party-affiliated candidates in SMD races often serve to
generate additional support for parties in the PR tier. Indeed, Mizusaki and Mori (1998)
show that the placement of an Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) candidate in a single-
member district boosted the percentage of the party vote from an average of 0.42 to
13.2%, with higher boosts coming from the least populated localities.
5
The results of Mizuzaki and Mori’s research suggest the importance accorded to
Japan’s SMD tier for large parties like the LDP and the DPJ, who often find it useful to
encourage their candidates to compete in both tiers in order to help the parties win the
maximum number of SMD and PR seats. In addition, parties contribute considerable
levels of financial resources to their nominees in the SMD tier to help both candidate and
party. In 2000, the LDP awarded newcomers approximately ¥14.7 million ($139,000),
with incumbents receiving as much as ¥22.4 million or $211,000 (Carlson 2003: 86).
However, individual candidates must still spend considerable sums of money beyond the
party subsidy if they want to win or keep their seat. Thus, an examination of the SMD tier
in Japan will shed valuable light on the strategic response of elites to the new formal rules.
4
Alternatively, because parties may rank their candidates at the same PR list positions, some candidates are
selected through the use of a “best-loser” provision, which is calculated on the basis of their performance in
the SMD tier by taking the number of votes the candidate receives divided by votes won by the first-place
finisher.
5
In areas with fewer than 10,000 people, which was the smallest population unit analyzed, the LDP party
vote increased from 32.56 to 45.77% with the presence of an SMD candidate, while in the most populated
areas (more than 30,000 people), from 28.88 to 29.23%.
Convention