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Sovereign as Totem: Symbolic Authority in the Legal Structure of Hobbes's Leviathan

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Abstract:

Something of a tension exists in
Hobbes's theory of sovereignty by institution. On the one hand, the
sovereign is not a party of the social contract, but is rather a
beneficiary of the simultaneous act of all subjects renouncing their
resprective right of nature. In this sense, Hobbes clearly argues that
subjects cannot hold the sovereign to account for anything he might do
or to any obligation under the civil laws of the state. Subjects have
nothing but duties to the sovereign, but he has no obligations to them.
On the other hand, Hobbes notes that the sovereign is obliged to the
laws of nature (at least to enforce those laws) and to God, which
appears to denote, at least indirectly, an obligation to his subjects.
Some commentators have even argued that this obligation to the laws of
nature on behalf of the sovereign results in the de facto granting of
certain rights to his subjects. The tension between these two positions
points to a question of the absolute status and arbitrary nature of the
sovereign. The second position appears to limit the status and
potentially arbitrary rule of the sovereign, while the first position
seems to enhance these features. In light of Freud's theory of
authority as spelled out in Totem and Taboo, one could say that the
first position outlines a kind of primal father who monopolizes power
by remaining in the state of nature and retaining the right to all
things, while the second position outlines the more benevolent,
symbolic father who is instituted by the guilty brothers in order to
maintain prohibitions upon themselves and create political equality.
This paper will argue the case that Hobbes's sovereign possesses both
these qualities at once and, furthermore, with a close examination of
the structure of legal interpretation in Leviathan, this dual status
will not be viewed as contradictory. It is in the legal structure of
Hobbes's theory of state that Freud's theory of emotional ambivalence
may find one of its most salient and unconscious theoretical
embodiments. Here, Hobbes's seemingly contradictory understanding of
sovereignty may be smoothed out if we supplement Hobbes's concern with
ultimate legal authority with Freud's understanding of the Ur-crime
and its consequent totemic structure. Legal interpretaion, as Hobbes
understands it, presupposes both fathers. In this manner, Hobbes's
sovereign can be viewed as always absolute, but never
arbitrary.
Convention
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Association:
Name: The Midwest Political Science Association
URL:
http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/


Citation:
URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p82862_index.html
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MLA Citation:

Cameron, Kevin. "Sovereign as Totem: Symbolic Authority in the Legal Structure of Hobbes's Leviathan" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p82862_index.html>

APA Citation:

Cameron, K. , 2004-04-15 "Sovereign as Totem: Symbolic Authority in the Legal Structure of Hobbes's Leviathan" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p82862_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Something of a tension exists in
Hobbes's theory of sovereignty by institution. On the one hand, the
sovereign is not a party of the social contract, but is rather a
beneficiary of the simultaneous act of all subjects renouncing their
resprective right of nature. In this sense, Hobbes clearly argues that
subjects cannot hold the sovereign to account for anything he might do
or to any obligation under the civil laws of the state. Subjects have
nothing but duties to the sovereign, but he has no obligations to them.
On the other hand, Hobbes notes that the sovereign is obliged to the
laws of nature (at least to enforce those laws) and to God, which
appears to denote, at least indirectly, an obligation to his subjects.
Some commentators have even argued that this obligation to the laws of
nature on behalf of the sovereign results in the de facto granting of
certain rights to his subjects. The tension between these two positions
points to a question of the absolute status and arbitrary nature of the
sovereign. The second position appears to limit the status and
potentially arbitrary rule of the sovereign, while the first position
seems to enhance these features. In light of Freud's theory of
authority as spelled out in Totem and Taboo, one could say that the
first position outlines a kind of primal father who monopolizes power
by remaining in the state of nature and retaining the right to all
things, while the second position outlines the more benevolent,
symbolic father who is instituted by the guilty brothers in order to
maintain prohibitions upon themselves and create political equality.
This paper will argue the case that Hobbes's sovereign possesses both
these qualities at once and, furthermore, with a close examination of
the structure of legal interpretation in Leviathan, this dual status
will not be viewed as contradictory. It is in the legal structure of
Hobbes's theory of state that Freud's theory of emotional ambivalence
may find one of its most salient and unconscious theoretical
embodiments. Here, Hobbes's seemingly contradictory understanding of
sovereignty may be smoothed out if we supplement Hobbes's concern with
ultimate legal authority with Freud's understanding of the Ur-crime
and its consequent totemic structure. Legal interpretaion, as Hobbes
understands it, presupposes both fathers. In this manner, Hobbes's
sovereign can be viewed as always absolute, but never
arbitrary.

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Associated Document Available The Midwest Political Science Association
Associated Document Available Political Research Online


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