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How Human Dignity Grounds Human Rights: Two Paradigms

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Abstract:

Over the last 100 years the notion of human dignity has
gained more and more importance in the political discourse on human
rights. Whereas, for instance, the UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) names dignity as one justification for human rights among
others, the two UN Covenants on Rights (1966) ground human rights
solely on dignity. Yet in these documents human dignity is neither
defined nor justified. It remains unclear how exactly dignity grounds
rights. The UN documents state that dignity is an “inherent property”,
because of which we can make claims upon others. In conceiving dignity,
people often refer to Immanuel Kant, as he defines dignity as “absolute
inner value,” and his request to “treat others always at the same time
as an end, never merely as a means” seems to encapsulate what it means
to respect the dignity of others. In my paper I argue that the UN
notion of dignity is a recent invention and uses a different paradigm
than was common throughout the ages. The UN notion construes dignity as
an inherent value property. Because human beings contain this value,
they are justified in claiming rights. The traditional concept, in
contrast, uses a different paradigm. Cicero was the first who used the
roman word ‘dignitas’ to express the Ancient Greek idea that reason
uplifts all human beings over the rest of nature. This special status
does not yield rights, but duties: because reason lifts us up over
animals, we should use reason and not behave like animals. There are
three difference between the traditional and the UN notion of dignity:
a) the traditional notion does not conceive of dignity as an inherent
value property, b) it does not ground rights but duties, c) it is not
concerned about others, but about one’s own duty to perfect oneself.
With slight variations, the traditional concept stayed the same
throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Kant is still part of
this tradition. For him it is the freedom of our reason that uplifts us
over the rest of nature. Because of our freedom we have the duty –
expressed through his Categorical Imperative – to be morally good and
thus perfect ourselves. His request to treat others never merely as a
means is a Categorical Imperative also. The reason why we should
respect others is not an inherent value property of others, but our own
duty. For Kant, the right (the Categorical Imperative) is prior to the
good, and the duty of the agent prior to the right of the person
affected. While the UN conception of dignity is teleological, Kant
argument is deontological.
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Association:
Name: The Midwest Political Science Association
URL:
http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/


Citation:
URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p82957_index.html
Direct Link:
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MLA Citation:

Sensen, Oliver. "How Human Dignity Grounds Human Rights: Two Paradigms" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p82957_index.html>

APA Citation:

Sensen, O. , 2004-04-15 "How Human Dignity Grounds Human Rights: Two Paradigms" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p82957_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Over the last 100 years the notion of human dignity has
gained more and more importance in the political discourse on human
rights. Whereas, for instance, the UN Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) names dignity as one justification for human rights among
others, the two UN Covenants on Rights (1966) ground human rights
solely on dignity. Yet in these documents human dignity is neither
defined nor justified. It remains unclear how exactly dignity grounds
rights. The UN documents state that dignity is an “inherent property”,
because of which we can make claims upon others. In conceiving dignity,
people often refer to Immanuel Kant, as he defines dignity as “absolute
inner value,” and his request to “treat others always at the same time
as an end, never merely as a means” seems to encapsulate what it means
to respect the dignity of others. In my paper I argue that the UN
notion of dignity is a recent invention and uses a different paradigm
than was common throughout the ages. The UN notion construes dignity as
an inherent value property. Because human beings contain this value,
they are justified in claiming rights. The traditional concept, in
contrast, uses a different paradigm. Cicero was the first who used the
roman word ‘dignitas’ to express the Ancient Greek idea that reason
uplifts all human beings over the rest of nature. This special status
does not yield rights, but duties: because reason lifts us up over
animals, we should use reason and not behave like animals. There are
three difference between the traditional and the UN notion of dignity:
a) the traditional notion does not conceive of dignity as an inherent
value property, b) it does not ground rights but duties, c) it is not
concerned about others, but about one’s own duty to perfect oneself.
With slight variations, the traditional concept stayed the same
throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Kant is still part of
this tradition. For him it is the freedom of our reason that uplifts us
over the rest of nature. Because of our freedom we have the duty –
expressed through his Categorical Imperative – to be morally good and
thus perfect ourselves. His request to treat others never merely as a
means is a Categorical Imperative also. The reason why we should
respect others is not an inherent value property of others, but our own
duty. For Kant, the right (the Categorical Imperative) is prior to the
good, and the duty of the agent prior to the right of the person
affected. While the UN conception of dignity is teleological, Kant
argument is deontological.

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Associated Document Available Political Research Online


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