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Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83063_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Primo, David. "Open vs. Closed Rules in Budget Legislation: A Result and an Application" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83063_index.html>

Primo, D. M. , 2004-04-15 "Open vs. Closed Rules in Budget Legislation: A Result and an Application" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83063_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) divide-the-dollar game is one of the most cited bargaining models in political science. A main result of the model is that legislatures will prefer closed rules to open rules in distributive politics bargaining because closed rules eliminate the possibility of delay. However, open rules are far more prevalent in the budget process at both the federal and state level. This puzzle is resolved by considering a variant on Baron and Ferejohn's model that permits spending to vary rather than being prefixed. Under these conditions, an open rule is almost always preferred to a closed rule by the legislature. The model is then applied to the problem of enforcing spending limits. I demonstrate that the legislature's preference for open rules is so strong that it is typically unwilling to trade off a closed rule for lower levels of spending under most supermajority passage requirements. A silver lining is that endogenous enforcement tends to work well under simple majority rule. This result has implications for the design and enforcement of rules in legislatures.

U.S. State Legislative Term Limits: Spending and Budget Deficit Effects

Restrictive Rules, Restrained Spending: The Endogenous Enforcement of Spending Limits in Legislatures

The Causes and Consequences of Time Legislators Spend Fundraising for Themselves and for their Caucuses: Modeling Effects of Institutional Design and Personal and Political Context in State Legislatures