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Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83161_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

McKay, Amy. and Yackee, Susan Webb. "Does the Squeaky Wheel Get the Grease? Interest Group Influence on the Bureaucracy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83161_index.html>

McKay, A. and Yackee, S. , 2004-04-15 "Does the Squeaky Wheel Get the Grease? Interest Group Influence on the Bureaucracy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p83161_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: While many studies have been conducted regarding the strategic behavior of interest groups, few have empirically examined whether groups compete against each other to change government policies. We ask, does lobbying on one side of a policy issue beget lobbying on the other? Further, how do government officials react to these competing demands? Using data from almost 1,700 comments on 40 government rules, we test two theories: 1) as lobbyists on one side of an issue increase their efforts, lobbyists on the other side will respond in kind, and 2) as the difference between the intensity level of the two sides increases, the bureaucrat is increasingly likely to act in favor of the dominant side. We find that 1) as the pressure from one group of interests increases, so too does the pressure exerted by opposing groups, and 2) as the split between the interest groups becomes more lopsided, the likelihood that bureaucrats will alter the content of final rules to match the preferences of the dominant side increases. In short, in the U.S. federal bureaucracy, the squeaky wheel gets the grease.

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