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You can Get Anything You have the
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Anything You Have the Votes to Get
11
This section takes four approaches to assessing the degree to which empirical patterns of congressional behavior
and presidential influence mirror these structural results. The first two rely on data drawn from the confidential White House reports on anticipated House member positions drawn from the Lyndon Johnson presidential archives and covering the administration’s priority policy recommendations. These data amount to approximately 17,000 observations of initial positions on administration headcounts taken typically two weeks prior to the critical close vote on the administration’s policy. Table 3 summarizes the positions taken by House members when given the opportunity on administration proposals. As the table indicates, the average Johnson administration bill began far from a majority coalition with only a third of the membership willing to commit to the administration initially. Those commitments secured, however, the President’s team faced a difficult pull with the remaining membership heavily weighted towards negative positions, at either “Wrong” or simply refusing to comment on their position. The second two assessments rely on more qualitative data drawn from Johnson White House records involving the Senate. In all of these assessments of the structural model, the analysis employs Poole-Rosenthal NOMINATE coefficients as a representation of the dictates of distance.
T
T
H
H
E
E
D
D
I
I
C
C
T
T
A
A
T
T
E
E
S
S
O
O
F
F
D
D
I
I
S
S
T
T
A
A
N
N
C
C
E
E
A
A
N
N
D
D
C
C
O
O
A
A
L
L
I
I
T
T
I
I
O
O
N
N
S
S
Figure 5 illustrates the first two of these assessments, employing House data on member initial positions. The
bivariate regression of initial positions on the structural “ideals” represented by NOMINATE accounts for about one-third of the variance. The figure also reports the basic statistics on the regression model. The constant suggests that the standard response occurs around “Undecided” and that a slight change in the structural ideals, away from the President, yields a moderately impressive change in initial position, also away from the President. slightly better than the standard “naïve” or three-party model of congressional position-taking. The coefficient of determination for the naïve and structural models combined suggests an improvement of around 7% (Kruskal
λ
), which at this level of
analysis does not constitute a great improvement over the standard model.
In summary, then, the structural model presents a baseline for presidential influence, but on those issues most
important to an administration, its priority bills, the structural theory represents but half the story.
I
I
N
N
T
T
H
H
E
E
N
N
O
O
R
R
M
M
A
A
L
L
S
S
P
P
A
A
C
C
E
E
The structural theory provides a baseline, but it raises a number of questions as well when considering what
actually happens. In turn, these anomalies suggest the possibility of a different, strategic approach. The anecdotal evidence presented here derives from extensive research in the John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson presidential libraries [hereafter JFKL and LBJL, respectively] and focuses initially on one presidential priority held in common by these two presidents: the Tax Cut of 1964. The major priority of its administration, the Kennedy White House proposed the tax cut as fulfillment for its 1960 campaign promise to “get this country moving again.” Entangled in a number of side issues, including a brief but troublesome association with its civil rights bill, the administration’s tax cut lingered in the House and then the Senate throughout most of 1962 and 1963.
T
T
a
a
b
b
l
l
e
e
3
3
.
.
A
A
v
v
e
e
r
r
a
a
g
g
e
e
I
I
n
n
i
i
t
t
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a
a
l
l
R
R
e
e
s
s
p
p
o
o
n
n
s
s
e
e
s
s
,
,
H
H
o
o
u
u
s
s
e
e
Initial
Position
%
Right
33%
Leaning
Right
3%
Undecided
5%
Absent
1%
Leaning
Wrong
2%
Wrong
14%
No
Comment
40%
N of cases
16886
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| | Authors: Sullivan, Terry. |
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Anything You Have the Votes to Get
11
This section takes four approaches to assessing the degree to which empirical patterns of congressional behavior
and presidential influence mirror these structural results. The first two rely on data drawn from the confidential White
House reports on anticipated House member positions drawn from the Lyndon Johnson presidential archives and
covering the administration’s priority policy recommendations.
These data amount to approximately 17,000 observations of initial
positions on administration headcounts taken typically two weeks
prior to the critical close vote on the administration’s policy. Table
3 summarizes the positions taken by House members when given
the opportunity on administration proposals. As the table
indicates, the average Johnson administration bill began far from a
majority coalition with only a third of the membership willing to
commit to the administration initially. Those commitments
secured, however, the President’s team faced a difficult pull with
the remaining membership heavily weighted towards negative
positions, at either “Wrong” or simply refusing to comment on
their position. The second two assessments rely on more
qualitative data drawn from Johnson White House records
involving the Senate. In all of these assessments of the structural model, the analysis employs Poole-Rosenthal
NOMINATE coefficients as a representation of the dictates of distance.
T
T
H
H
E
E
D
D
I
I
C
C
T
T
A
A
T
T
E
E
S
S
O
O
F
F
D
D
I
I
S
S
T
T
A
A
N
N
C
C
E
E
A
A
N
N
D
D
C
C
O
O
A
A
L
L
I
I
T
T
I
I
O
O
N
N
S
S
bivariate regression of initial positions on the structural “ideals” represented by NOMINATE accounts for about
one-third of the variance. The figure also reports the basic statistics on the regression model. The constant suggests
that the standard response occurs around “Undecided” and that a slight change in the structural ideals, away from the
President, yields a moderately impressive change in initial position, also away from the President. slightly better than
the standard “naïve” or three-party model of congressional position-taking. The coefficient of determination for the
naïve and structural models combined suggests an improvement of around 7% (Kruskal
λ
), which at this level of
analysis does not constitute a great improvement over the standard model.
In summary, then, the structural model presents a baseline for presidential influence, but on those issues most
important to an administration, its priority bills, the structural theory represents but half the story.
I
I
N
N
T
T
H
H
E
E
N
N
O
O
R
R
M
M
A
A
L
L
S
S
P
P
A
A
C
C
E
E
The structural theory provides a baseline, but it raises a number of questions as well when considering what
actually happens. In turn, these anomalies suggest the possibility of a different, strategic approach. The anecdotal
evidence presented here derives from extensive research in the John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson presidential
libraries [hereafter JFKL and LBJL, respectively] and focuses initially on one presidential priority held in common by
these two presidents: the Tax Cut of 1964. The major priority of its administration, the Kennedy White House
proposed the tax cut as fulfillment for its 1960 campaign promise to “get this country moving again.” Entangled in a
number of side issues, including a brief but troublesome association with its civil rights bill, the administration’s tax
cut lingered in the House and then the Senate throughout most of 1962 and 1963.
T
T
a
a
b
b
l
l
e
e
3
3
.
.
A
A
v
v
e
e
r
r
a
a
g
g
e
e
I
I
n
n
i
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t
t
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l
l
R
R
e
e
s
s
p
p
o
o
n
n
s
s
e
e
s
s
,
,
H
H
o
o
u
u
s
s
e
e
Position
%
Right
33%
Leaning
Right
3%
Undecided
5%
Absent
1%
Leaning
Wrong
2%
Wrong
14%
No
Comment
40%
N of cases
16886
|
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