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The existing literature also tends to minimize the role of culture as an indicator of policy
development and representative position. There are, however, some theoretical threads of the cultural
thesis to be seen. These threads suggest that “variation in state-level partisanship and ideology is due to
state-level differences in political culture rather than the demographic characteristics . . . it is clear that the
political attitudes of U.S. citizens vary in important ways on the basis of where in the United States they
live (Erikson, McIver, and Wright, Jr., 1987, 802). As such, it is important to conduct assessments with an
eye toward the cultural and political idiosyncrasies within and between states and locales.
9
A HOUSE DIVIDED
“Pro-life” ecclesiastical elites have been, until this point, treated as a homogenous group. It would
be fallacious, however, to assume that all ecclesiastical elites and Christian organizations seek to instill a
“pro-life” influence on the local culture. It is well documented that many in mainline Protestant
denominations take a “pro-choice” position. Yet there is reason to suspect that the even in the evangelical
wing of Protestantism, either because of the aversion of some to political involvement, or actual elite
disunity over abortion, there is palpable dissention on the issue (Watt, 2002, 109; Hart, 2002, 169-171).
With only 5 percent of evangelical adherents claiming to be “pro-choice” in recent polling, the claim here
is not that an evangelical parishioner sea change on abortion is in the making (Barna Research Group,
9
Certainly, a valid critique of the culture-based approach is to suggest that culture, as influenced by parishes and congregations
on reproductive rights issues in specific, is a misspecification of what is actually driving representative abortion positions—
generally conservative political preferences within a district, state, and/or region. While this is an important perspective, such an
explanation leaves to be seen how and why districts will possess conservative preferences, especially on social policy issues. In
other words, there must be something driving these conservative preferences that cannot be assumed to exist prima facie.
Part of understanding a district’s conservative preferences comes through distinguishing between different types of
conservative ideology. There is a difference between economic conservatism, which is concerned almost exclusively with
limiting government activities in particular policy realms, and social conservatism, which attempts to limit the scope of
acceptable behavior for individuals, including, but not limited to, abortion. It is along this social/economic distinction that many
persons of faith, especially Catholics, construct their political alliances (Greeley, 1977, 201).
When the issue involves abortion, Reichley suggests a strong influence for ecclesiastical elites. “Religion has been the
underlying thread of moral unity . . . the main threads of our religious tradition have fostered a shared commitment to . . . the
sanctity of human life . . .” (1986, 47). Ecclesiastical elites are not necessarily strong influences on culture and representative
position when salient local issues are of an economic concern specifically. This is why party organizations, civic groups,
neighborhoods, the business community, artistic guilds, and non-profit social service providers all play an important role in
creating, maintaining, and changing local culture. Depending upon the array of issues that are salient in a district, the
ecclesiastical elites might actually not be considered at all influential in the local cultural calculus. Hence, any single variable
distinction (i.e., party identification or elite influence over all other variables) that some might make concerning representative
position taking on abortion appears to be fundamentally wrong-headed. Instead, it is far more fruitful to treat a variety of casual
variables as equally important indicators of elite influence and cultural tenor in a legislative district.
Convention