Cardona
MPSA 2004
5
Another, and I would argue, more fundamental problem, involves how to ensure
that different social groups respect the constitutional process by which power is assumed
and authority exercised, i.e., elections. This problem gives rise to the problem of how to
create stable rules of the game for constitutional governance. How does a society go
about developing practices of political competition such that a relatively stable and well-
defined group of actors organize, compete for, and exercise political authority, within the
framework of norms established by the constitution? In other words, how do societies
make constitutional rule stick?
I argue that two forms of solution to this problem are available. One is political,
and involves the design of political institutions of power-sharing, such as legislative
institutions or the electoral rule (Mazzuca and Robinson 2003). Another is military, and
involves the design of institutions related to the coercive apparatus of the state. I define
these institutions as the “public forces,” adopting the Latin American usage, “fuerza
pública,” which comprises not only the traditional armed forces (army, navy, air force),
but also the national and subnational police.
4
The following section explores a key
dimension of this concept, and argues for its relevance for considering regime stability.
Centralization vs. Decentralization of Command in the Public Forces
One key decision policy-makers can take with respect to the institutional design
of the public forces is the degree to which the public forces are centralized with respect to
command. That is, are the different institutions of armed state power aligned under a
single (military) command, or do they respond to different agencies and ministries within
4
For example, Article 216 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991 defines the Fuerza Pública as comprising
the Fuerzas Militares (Army, Navy, Air Force) and the Policia Nacional (Article 216).
Convention