2
particular, surprisingly little attention addresses the question of why states are likely to choose
ambiguity over transparency.
1
Typically, studies justify commitment variation based on arguments
motivated by transaction costs of unforeseen contingencies, domestic political and organizational
pressures, and bounded rationality. The results of our study go beyond transaction costs and
constraints to show that the form of commitment is often a strategic choice and, under certain
conditions, flexible and ambiguous commitments can actually outperform firmer and more
transparent alternatives.
The second body of literature that our study addresses is deterrence theory. Deterrence
theorists have focused on understanding how states can make deterrence threats credible. The
commonly accepted solution is to extend firm and transparent defense commitments. Yet,
historical counter-examples demonstrate that states’ deterrence strategies are often flexible and
ambiguous. Perceptive empiricists have identified these anomalies, and, recently, deterrence
theorists have begun to attempt explanations of this counter-intuitive phenomenon. The results of
our study make key theoretical contributions to this unfolding extension of deterrence theory.
In this paper, we demonstrate formally that under certain conditions deliberately
ambiguous security commitments can work to deter adversaries from destabilizing the status quo.
Indeed, as the results of the formal argument will show, not only can ambiguous commitments be
successful, but counter-intuitively they can work when transparent commitments alternatives would
inadvertently bring about the very catastrophe that they are intended to deter.
I. The Research Puzzle
Understanding commitment behavior has emerged as one of the central subjects of interest
in the study of politics and international relations. Central to the study of commitment problems
1
Studies about political ambiguity have mostly been limited to understanding candidates’ use of
ambiguity as a campaign strategy in electoral competitions. See, for example, Shepsle 1972, Page
1976, Alesina and Cukierman 1990, Glazer 1990, and Aragones and Neeman 2000. Little research
has been done on the role of ambiguity in other areas of politics including the formation of
international commitment strategies.
Convention