Convention Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84409_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Elder, Mark. "Reconciling Trade Protection andExport Promotion in Industrial Policy: A Comparative Study ofDistributional Conflict and Cooperation between Steel and Steel-usingIndustries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84409_index.html>

Elder, M. A. , 2004-04-15 "Reconciling Trade Protection andExport Promotion in Industrial Policy: A Comparative Study ofDistributional Conflict and Cooperation between Steel and Steel-usingIndustries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84409_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This study will examine one of the most important and least studied problems of trade and industrial policy: whether and how governments have been able to prevent policies designed to help one industry from hurting other industries, especially exporters. This study focuses on the steel industry and two of its major customers, automobiles and shipbuilding. Promoting the steel industry was a central focus of trade and industrial policies in Japan and many other countries in the postwar period. These countries also tried to simultaneously promote steel-using industries such as automobiles and/or shipbuilding, and turn them into successful exporters. The key problem is that one of the main policies used to promote steel, trade protection, raises its price, thereby hurting the competitiveness of industries that use steel. This problem is especially urgent if governments are trying to turn steel-using industries into exporters, which cannot pass on the higher costs to foreign customers. This study will compare the political process by which this conflict of interest over trade and industrial policy was dealt with in Japan to what happened in six other countries: South Korea, Taiwan, Britain, Germany, Brazil, and the US. This diverse set of countries adopted different sets of industrial and trade policies to try to reconcile (or ignore) conflicting interests between steel producers and consumers. Possible explanations for different policies that this study will evaluate include political and economic institutions, industrial organization, relative political strength of the different industries, levels of development, and international factors. I found that there is a broad pattern of steel-using industries being compensated for higher steel prices by various means in a wide range of countries in different stages of development. Particularly in East Asian countries, great care has been taken to avoid allowing protection for steel to hurt export industries that use steel. Moreover, some governments successfully pressured “infant” steel industries to “grow up” to be competitive in export markets, contrary to the prediction of neoclassical economics that infant industries grow politically powerful enough to retain protection indefinitely. It appears that in major steel producing countries, there is a rough balance of power between steel producers and steel-using industries, although the costs of protection for steel are ultimately borne by domestic household consumers. The approach taken here is very different from most studies of industrial policy, which typically focus on only one country and ask whether the policy succeeded in developing a particular industry or not, without discussing the connections between related industries.

Why the Hegemon's Foreign Policy Differs in the Core and Periphery? - US Foreign Policy Variation in Industrialized Democracies and Third World Countries

Why Might Exporters Support Trade Protection for Suppliers? The Strange Case of Corporate Trade Policy Preferences of Steel-using Industries in Comparative Perspective