3
policy have become similar to the bitter partisan divide that dominates the domestic
political agenda. Indeed, from the budget shutdowns to the impeachment of President
William Clinton to the passage of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA),
partisanship played a significant role in the legislative process of the 1990s. As a
consequence, members of Congress may be more likely to heed to constituent factors
when legislating domestic and foreign policy issues, including trade liberalization
measures, to ensure electoral popularity.
We begin by providing a general historical outline of the relationship between
Congress and the President regarding foreign trade policy. Next, we develop a model of
House foreign policy making that accounts for a number of political and constituency
factors. We evaluate this model by analyzing a national data set consisting of partisan
and constituency information for members of the House during the years 1993 through
2000 (the Clinton administration). Lastly, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the
results and suggest further paths of research.
A DIVIDED AMERICAN TRADE POLICY
The divided nature of congressional foreign economic policymaking may be
traced to the Constitution itself. Whereas, the presidential entitlement of “Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” granted by the American
constitution would gradually allow the President to become the chief decision maker of
American defense policy, Congress has the exclusive authority to “regulate commerce
with foreign nations.”
4
Although at times Congress has delegated the President the
4
See Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution.
Convention