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Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84443_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Simonelli, Nicole. "Divided Government, Parties, and U.S. Trade Policy: How Domestic Institutions and Partisan Control Affect Trade Policy, 1947-2002" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 15, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84443_index.html>

Simonelli, N. M. , 2004-04-15 "Divided Government, Parties, and U.S. Trade Policy: How Domestic Institutions and Partisan Control Affect Trade Policy, 1947-2002" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p84443_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: Using data from 1949-1990 Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994) find that the existence of divided government is positively associated with the level of protectionism in the United States. Clark (1998) refutes their results with the addition of two years of data; he finds that divided government is negatively associated with protectionism. By increasing the sample size with the addition of the years 1991-2002, this paper re-analyzes the Lohmann and O’Halloran model. I generate additional hypotheses by building partisan preferences on trade into their theoretical framework. I find little support for the Lohmann and O’Halloran model. First, divided government is negatively associated with protectionism, as is a Republican Congress. However, Republican presidents are associated with higher tariff levels. There is weak evidence that partisan preferences toward trade matter: using an interactive variable to measure partisan control of the presidency and Congress, divided government only makes a difference when the president is a Democrat and Congress is Republican.

Who is the Party? Partisan Sources of Communication: The Role of Congress and the President in Shaping Public Perceptions of the Party

Parties in Conflict: How the Republican and Democratic Parties Managed their Media, Message and Money in the 2004 Presidential and Senate Races in Florida