the justification of arms procurement policy, in which legitimacy and effectiveness being
central concerns (Anthony 1998:871, 873). The related issues are especially sensitive and
significant to the Taiwanese who are bitterly torn about all the inefficiency and
misconduct that has happened in the past when they had little choice about foreign
acquisitions. While the misconduct can be remedied in a less painful way by
strengthening procurement procedures and regulations, policy legitimacy is much more
difficult to achieve. In Taiwan, the situation is exacerbated by the highly alarmed
confidentiality of its national security and the meagre assistance offered by the country’s
diplomatic and intelligence systems due to its isolated international status (Swaine
1999:14-15 23-24, Singth 2000:222 224, Lo 2000:191). Accordingly, the Ministry of
National Defense (MND) in conjunction with its subordinate services play a dominant
role in arms acquisition decisions, acting simultaneously as a planner and a user and
inevitably having vested interests. Therefore, at a time when cost effects and strategic
implications other than the supply channel need to be taken into account, the legitimacy of
policymaking and the accountability of professional reasoning are at the centre of policy
debates.
II. Policy Process, Legitimacy and Accountability
According to the new defence system formulated by the National Defense Law and the
Organisation Law for the Ministry of National Defense, the responsibility for Taiwan’s
military affairs is shared by three main systems: the military administration, the military
command and the military armament system (MND 2002a:P6 C1 II). Ideally, foreign
acquisition programmes, as part of national military armament policy and acquisition
strategy, are assessed by the military armament system in the light of overall national
strategic plans delineated by the military administration system and forces requirements
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Convention