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economic deprivation have the greatest incentives for demanding self-governance. In
contrast, Gourevitch (1979) argues that economic growth, in combination with leadership
and ethnic potential, creates incentives for demanding self-determination.
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Drawing from
these theories, I hypothesize that states will fight hardest to retain relatively wealthy regions
that contribute to the overall wealth of the state.
Balance of power theories focus on the ability of each side of a conflict to inflict
costs on the other (Huth, Gelpi and Bennett 1993, Huth 1996). These theories are largely
focused on international relations, but the logic can be applied to self-determination conflicts
as well. Balance of power theories argue that the closer the power balance between self-
determination groups and central states, the more hesitant states will be to pursue a costly
conflict and therefore the greater the chance of settlement.
Reputation approaches identify the effect of settling or fighting on the state’s
reputation as the primary determinant of when state will accommodate self-determination
challengers. Walter (2003) argues that governments may choose not to accommodate self-
determination group demands, even in the face of great costs, when they are attempting to
stake their reputation. When states face a large number of other possible challenges for self-
determination, they will invest in a reputation of intractability to deter future challengers.
A number of hypotheses can be drawn from these competing theories and the
theory I have presented here. I present a list of competing hypotheses as well as their
expected sign in Table 1.
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A second body of literature also allows me to generate some testable hypotheses about economic factors and
the likelihood of autonomy. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) argue that there may in fact be an optimal number
and size of nations based on the trade off between the efficiency of national economies of scale and
specialization in the international economy.
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Others (Bolton and Roland, 1997 and Fearon and van Houten,
n.d.) have continued in this vein, offering some empirical tests from a set of European cases. Drawing from
these theories I hypothesize that states with greater trade openness are more likely to offer autonomy. I will
test this hypothesis in a future version of this paper.
Convention