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(Robinson, 2003). However, the question of how long this balance will be held is in question
given questions and plans suggested both by the Bush White House and the Department of
Homeland Security (Isenberg, 2002).
CURRENT GRUMBLING – FUTURE PROBLEMS
It is clear the National Guard can, and do, fill a wide variety of roles. However, they too
are a limited resource. Extended overseas duty in ambiguous “occupation” roles increases the
strain on those at home given the absence of first providers and community leaders. The
privations and distance increases the likelihood of increased separation and thus fewer troops
over the long term. This was first openly seen in a 2003 Stars and Stripes convenience poll of
troops in Iraq. Nearly 49 percent said they would separate at their earliest opportunity with
reservists expressing the greatest dissatisfaction and lowest morale (Graham & Milbank, 2003).
If even somewhat reflective, this a staggering rate. It presents a dangerous potential for gaps in
both active duty and the reserve forces that would ordinarily be used to fill such gaps. If recent
congressional activity to limit further use of reserves is any indicator, dissatisfaction with the
current state may be even greater in the reserve forces and their supporters than in the active
duty. Thus, the declaration by the chief of the National Guard Bureau and NORTHCOM Chief
of Staff, Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, that the "weekend warrior is dead," bodes ill. Blum notes the
"National Guard is and will continue to be used at a rate that is unprecedented..." with active
duty rates expected to remain above 100,000 for at least two years (Currently nearly 180,000
Guard and reserve members are on active-duty with nearly three-quarters coming from the Army
which has historically had the most difficulty keeping its forces at full strength even during good
times (Garamone, 2004). This prediction makes no allowance for missions beyond those extant.
According to Blum and Lt. Gen. James Helmly, chief of the Army Reserve, there’s been no