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Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p85141_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Kselman, Daniel. and Niou, Emerson. "Why Voters Desert Their Favorite Candidate: Voting Behavior in 3-Candidate Plurality Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 07, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p85141_index.html>

Kselman, D. M. and Niou, E. , 2005-04-07 "Why Voters Desert Their Favorite Candidate: Voting Behavior in 3-Candidate Plurality Elections" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p85141_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: In this paper we analyze and begin to empirically test an amendment to the calculus of voting, an expected utility model of voter behavior. Both STRATEGIC and PROTEST voters may rationally choose a candidate other than their most-preferred.

Presidential Debates, Candidate Preferences, and Voting Behavior: Linking Debate Content to Voters' Assessments

Korean voters’ issue voting behavior in the 16th Korean presidential election