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Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p87010_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Heath, Roseanna Michelle. "Incompatible Institutions: The Combined Effects of Electoral Rules and the Organization of the National Legislature on Party Leadership and Backbenchers in Latin American Democratizing Countries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 07, 2005 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p87010_index.html>

Heath, R. , 2005-04-07 "Incompatible Institutions: The Combined Effects of Electoral Rules and the Organization of the National Legislature on Party Leadership and Backbenchers in Latin American Democratizing Countries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <.PDF>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p87010_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper is the theory chapter for a dissertation exploring the conditions under which party leadership and legislators successfully modify the legislature’s formal internal rules of order. In the dissertation, I present a theory to explain under what conditions either party leaders or legislators will attempt to reform the formal, written internal rules of order. I contend that when a recent modification in the electoral law creates a specific incentive structure (e.g., cultivate a personal or partisan vote), which is contradictory to what the internal rules of the congress permits these actors to do in order to pursue political goals, these players ought to attempt to modify the internal rules of order. I consider how the competing preferences on the part of backbenchers constrain party leaders’ behaviors in changing the internal rules of the congress. My approach, in this paper, is to present a model of the process to alter the formal rules of order in which party leaders anticipate possible future proposals by backbenchers. I use the model to identify when the threat of a backbencher rebellion force party leaders to consider legislator preferences when drafting new rules they would not otherwise. Additionally, I present hypotheses about how the effective number of parties, level of party discipline, turnover in a chamber, and the nature of legislator ambition might affect the likelihood of a successful attempt in altering a chamber’s internal rules of order.

Committee Leadership under Strong-Party Rule: A Study of Legislative Politics in Mexico, 1999 – 2008

Coalition Parties versus Coalitions of Parties: How Electoral Agency Shapes the Political Logic of Costs and Benefits

Chamber Medians, Party Medians and Theories of Party Politics in Congress