refugee protection. The trade model also implies that whilst we may see what appears to
be evidence of the ‘exploitation hypothesis’ on some dimension of collective goods
provision, the overall picture (when taking account of multiple contribution dimensions)
may be less inequitable.
Countries communicate/co-operate (especially in the EU)
A final assumption of the ‘exploitation model’ that appears to be overly restrictive
concerns its ‘non-consultation’ assumption. This assumption is grounded in non-
cooperative game theory (the prominent example being the prisoner’ dilemma). It
suggests that countries make decisions on public good provision without
consulting/cooperating with other countries. The ‘exploitation model’ requires an analyst
to assume that countries make their contribution decisions without considering their
impact on other countries (assuming that others will do their part, even if oneself does
not) (Boyer 1993: 39).
However, it is not at all unrealistic to expect countries to seek to address the sub-optimal
tendencies of public good provision by taking account (and reacting to) contributions
made by other countries (Cornes and Sandler 1984), by consulting (sometimes
pressurizing) other countries to ‘do their bit’ and by creating international institutions that
might help to overcome ‘credibility of commitment’ problems. Such institutions (or
regimes) can facilitate ‘repeated games/interactions’ which will lower the transaction
costs of decision-making on contributions, enhance predictability and trust among
contributors (Sandler and Canley 1977; Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984). In essence,
consultation through regimes decreases uncertainty and the risks that countries are
confronted with when making decisions about whether or not to cooperate with others
(Keohane 1984: 93-94). [see EU!] The various types of regimes that have been
developed for this purpose are discussed below.
2.3 International Burden-Sharing Regimes
From the discussion of the two models above, one can usefully distinguish two different
types of international burden-sharing regimes and four principal burden-sharing
mechanisms (see Table 1).
Table 1: Types of International Burden-Sharing
One dimensional
Multi dimensional
Common Rules
Compensation
Redistribution/Quotas
Trade
First, there are one-dimensional burden-sharing regimes that aim to equalize effort on one
particular contribution dimension. They often seek to equalize international efforts in
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Convention