(Page 13 of 16) - "Burden-Sharing": The International Politics of Refugee Protection authored by Thielemann, Eiko.

two ways – through common rules/ policy harmonization (ex ante equalization) or
through redistribution/quotas (ex-post equalization). The former method is based on the
assumption that inequalities in burdens can be overcome by agreeing on a common set of
rules that aims at equalizing the obligations in public good provision of individual states.
By obliging states to harmonize their policies or to comply with a set of common
inter/supranational rules, it is expected that the burdens that individual countries are faced
with will converge. For example, this has been a major driving force behind the creation
of the common EU asylum policy but similar concerns could already be seen in having
driven the creation of the Geneva Convention. [Non-Refugee Example?]. The idea with
ex-ante mechanism is that common rules will prevent unequal burdens from arising, thus
eliminating/reducing the need for corrective action.

Redistributive measures are classical ex-post measures, in the sense that they try to
equalize observed imbalances/inequities in burdens. Once a potential or actual imbalance
or inequity has been observed, measures are employed to address these. A prominent
instrument is the use of quotas that distribute burdens according to an agreed distribution
key (which is usually based on one or several fairness principles such as such as
responsibility, capacity, benefit or cost).

Examples can be found in efforts to harmonize

aid commitments to developing countries [check status/details/name of this agreement] or
the emission of green house gases through Kyoto/Montreal Protocol; NATO
commitments. The most prominent burden-sharing regime that relies on such a
mechanism can be found in the area of refugee resettlement where both voluntary
mechanisms and compulsory quotas are used to redistribute refugees across territories
[non-refugee example?].

Multi-dimensional burden-sharing regimes are those which do not seek to equalize
burdens/responsibilities on one particular contribution dimension alone. On the one
hand, there are those multi-dimensional regimes which are based on an explicit
compensation logic. In these cases a country’s disproportionate contribution on one
contribution dimension are recognized and that country gets compensated (through
benefits or cost-reductions) on other dimensions. [add General example: check Schuck].
In the refugee area, the most developed regime of this kind is the European Refugee Fund
which aims ‘to promote a ‘balance of efforts’ in receiving and bearing the consequences
of displaced persons’ in order ‘to demonstrate solidarity between the Member States’ in
their efforts to promote the social and economic integration of displaced persons.

The

ERF does so by allocating common European funds to Member States in relation to the
numbers of asylum-seekers and refugees that they are dealing with.

Beyond explicit compensatory multi-dimensional burden-sharing regimes, the world of
international diplomacy is full of examples where states, which are unable (or unwilling)
to contributions on one particular contribution dimension, have been induced through
moral or other pressure to contribute to the provision of international collective goods on
another dimension. The cheque-book diplomacy performed by Japan (and to an extent by

The ‘responsibility’ principle is commonly used in environmental regimes and also known as the

‘polluter pays’ principle. The ‘capacity’ principle refers to a state’s ‘ability to pay’ (and is often linked to
relative GDP). The ‘benefit’ principle proposes that states should contribute to a particular regime in
relation to the benefit they gain from it and the ‘cost’ principle suggests that states’ relative costs in making
certain contributions should be taken into account when establishing burden-sharing regimes.

Council Decision of 28 September 2000 (2000/596/EC), L252/12 of 6.10.2000.