(Page 2 of 16) - "Burden-Sharing": The International Politics of Refugee Protection authored by Thielemann, Eiko.

Introduction

Refugee protection tends to be a matter of international politics as it affects the
relationship between countries of origin and destination (host) countries.

It frequently

also affects the relations between one destination country and another, as national policy
responses to forced migration can produce significant externalities for other states.
Under-provision in the supply of transnational collective goods such as refugee
protection is often viewed as a logical consequence of resulting free-riding opportunities
that are created by such externalities. The central problem with international public/
collective goods is under-provision. Two key questions follow:

(1) Why do states provide international collective goods and why do some states
contribute less than others? Or put differently: What explains the distribution of
efforts in the provision of international collective goods?
(2) What can be done to improve the provision of international collective goods?
How can states provide international collective goods with greater efficiency and
equity?

The most developed body of literature addressing theses questions is the one on public
goods and collective action/free-riding. The origins of this literature go back to the
writings on the provision of public goods inside nation-states. Adam Smith (1994
[1776], p 779) noted the existence of certain products ‘which though they may be in the
highest degree advantageous to a great society are, however, of such a nature that the
profits would never repay the expenses to any individual or small number of individuals,
and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual or small number of
individuals should erect’ (see also Samuelson 1954 who further developed the distinction
between public and private goods). Since the late 1960s, public good analysis has been
applied to international problems (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Olson 1971; Hardin
1968; Russet and Sullivan 1971; Kindleberger 1986; Mendez 1992; Sandler 1992, 1997,
2004). This literature acknowledges that in many areas of public policy that were
traditional regarded as domestic in character, national policy decisions create externalities
for other states.

Given that the question of cooperation and non-cooperation between

nation-states is crucial for the provision of international public goods, their analysis has
been closely linked to the question about why countries cooperate, abide by or defect
from, international agreements (Keohane 1984; Krasner 1986; Axelrod 1984)

This paper does not deal with internally displaced persons.

The concept of externality refers to an interdependency, where the action of one agent imposes

consequences on others. In the international context, externalities arise when actions by one country
creates an uncompensated interdependency for other countries. Sandler (2004: 69) uses the example of a
country's power station which produces emissions that are causing pollution abroad, creating a negative
transnational externality. Unless the polluter is made to compensate its downwind neighbours, the polluter
has not inventive to curb its polluting activity (i.e., it is a case of market failure). A positive transnational
externality can also be created. For example, such a phenomenon may result when one country eliminates
a security threat that faces a number of countries. Decisions regarding a country's immigration policy (e.g.
decisions whether to open or close its borders to displaced persons) can thus have positive or negative
consequences for other countries. Regarding the relationship between public goods and externalities, it is
clear that in the case of international public goods the contribution decisions of each country potentially
affect the well-being of other countries. Sandler puts it like this: 'Every public good problem is an
externality' (2004:70).