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"Burden-Sharing": The International Politics of Refugee Protection
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Much of the literature on international public goods has stressed the existence of free-riding opportunities and has sought to explain the notorious under-provision of such goods. Given the ‘non-excludability characteristics’ of public goods, i.e. the fact that non-providers cannot be excluded from their consumption (see below), the reasons for this under-provision are well understood. However, it is less clear, and in some ways quite puzzling why, despite their particular characteristics, we do nonetheless see significant contributions by some states. While there has been some excellent international public good analysis in field such as military security, (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Oneal 1990a, 1990b; Sandler and Hartley 1999), trade (Birdsall and Lawrence 1999; Mendoza 2003), finance (Wyplosz 1999; Griffith-Jones 2003) and public health (Zacher 1999; Lincoln, Evans and Cash 19999; Arhin-Tenkorang and Conceicao 2003), there has not been any comprehensive public good analysis of refugee protection, even though it is quite clear that that national policy responses to forced migration also produce significant externalities to other states.
The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. It not only seeks to assess the usefulness of applying public good analysis to the case of forced migration and refugee protection. It also provides a critical analysis of the principal model of international burden-sharing in public goods as initially developed in the 1960s (Olson and Zeckauser 1966). Based on this critique, it proposes an alternative model international burden-sharing, one that is based on the idea of international trade in the provision of transnational public goods. This more comprehensive burden-sharing model does not only appear to be able to predict more accurately international efforts to provide transnational public goods. It also provides an analytical framework which can act as a lense through which existing international burden-sharing regimes can be scrutinized and assessed with regard to their efficiency and effectiveness in providing international public goods.
The Traditional ‘Exploitation’ Model: Public Goods, Externalities and Collective Action/ Free-riding
Public Goods, Externalities and Refugee Protection
A number of scholars, most prominently Suhrke (1998: 399-400), have suggested that refugee protection has important ‘international public good’ characteristics, adding to the rapidly growing literature on global public goods (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999; Kaul et al. 2003) and international collective action (Sandler 1992, 2004; Boyer 1993; Boyer et al. 2005). But what is a public good? By definition, a public good is characterized by the fact that no other country can be excluded from benefiting from this contribution (i.e. it is ‘non-excludable’) nor does consumption of the public good reduce the amount available for consumption by others (i.e. it is ‘non-rival’) (Reference???).
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A frequently used
example in the domestic context is that of the traffic light (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999:4). The benefits received from a person who crosses a street safely with the help
3
In contrast, a private good (say food) is characterised by its excludable and rival characteristics. In
today’s societies private goods are excludable through institutionally protected property rights. They are also rival as their consumption by one person means that the same unit cannot be consumed by anybody else at the same time.
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| | Authors: Thielemann, Eiko. |
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Much of the literature on international public goods has stressed the existence of free-
riding opportunities and has sought to explain the notorious under-provision of such
goods. Given the ‘non-excludability characteristics’ of public goods, i.e. the fact that
non-providers cannot be excluded from their consumption (see below), the reasons for
this under-provision are well understood. However, it is less clear, and in some ways
quite puzzling why, despite their particular characteristics, we do nonetheless see
significant contributions by some states. While there has been some excellent
international public good analysis in field such as military security, (Olson and
Zeckhauser 1966; Oneal 1990a, 1990b; Sandler and Hartley 1999), trade (Birdsall and
Lawrence 1999; Mendoza 2003), finance (Wyplosz 1999; Griffith-Jones 2003) and
public health (Zacher 1999; Lincoln, Evans and Cash 19999; Arhin-Tenkorang and
Conceicao 2003), there has not been any comprehensive public good analysis of refugee
protection, even though it is quite clear that that national policy responses to forced
migration also produce significant externalities to other states.
The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. It not only seeks to assess the usefulness of
applying public good analysis to the case of forced migration and refugee protection. It
also provides a critical analysis of the principal model of international burden-sharing in
public goods as initially developed in the 1960s (Olson and Zeckauser 1966). Based on
this critique, it proposes an alternative model international burden-sharing, one that is
based on the idea of international trade in the provision of transnational public goods.
This more comprehensive burden-sharing model does not only appear to be able to
predict more accurately international efforts to provide transnational public goods. It also
provides an analytical framework which can act as a lense through which existing
international burden-sharing regimes can be scrutinized and assessed with regard to their
efficiency and effectiveness in providing international public goods.
The Traditional ‘Exploitation’ Model: Public Goods, Externalities
and Collective Action/ Free-riding
Public Goods, Externalities and Refugee Protection
A number of scholars, most prominently Suhrke (1998: 399-400), have suggested that
refugee protection has important ‘international public good’ characteristics, adding to the
rapidly growing literature on global public goods (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999; Kaul
et al. 2003) and international collective action (Sandler 1992, 2004; Boyer 1993; Boyer et
al. 2005). But what is a public good? By definition, a public good is characterized by the
fact that no other country can be excluded from benefiting from this contribution (i.e. it is
‘non-excludable’) nor does consumption of the public good reduce the amount available
for consumption by others (i.e. it is ‘non-rival’) (Reference???).
example in the domestic context is that of the traffic light (Kaul, Grunberg and Stern
(1999:4). The benefits received from a person who crosses a street safely with the help
3
In contrast, a private good (say food) is characterised by its excludable and rival characteristics. In
today’s societies private goods are excludable through institutionally protected property rights. They are
also rival as their consumption by one person means that the same unit cannot be consumed by anybody
else at the same time.
3
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