Power tells us where to look for external influence on state strategy, whereas the political project of
the pole tells us how security policy decision makers are likely to want to respond to this influence,
i.e. about their willingness to balance or bandwagon with the superpower. Three factors are of
particular importance (cf. Mouritzen and Wivel 2005: 20-22).
First, the ideological distance between the governing elites of the unipole and those of other states
is of central importance, because – as noted by John M. Owen IV – ‘[u]ltimately, states balance
against power that is being, or that they fear may be, used against them’ (Owen 2002: 242). Thus,
we expect states to be more willing to balance a unipole with a rival ideology than a unipole with an
ideology similar to its own. Conflict is more likely between two states with rival ideologies,
because they tend to disagree on more issues that states with similar ideologies and, because
misperceptions are more likely between two states with rival ideologies than between two states
with similar ideologies, because they present their interests in language tied to their ideological
point of departure, which may inadvertently lead states with rival ideologies to perceive them as a
threat, i.e. the fondness of US policy makers to speak of the spread of freedom and democracy may
be intended as a promise to the world but perceived as a threat by those who favour other models of
society. In addition, the potential consequences of conflict are much worse for a state with a rival
ideology than for a state with a similar ideology, because loosing the conflict may force it to give up
core values. Conversely, we expect states to be more willing to bandwagon with a states with an
ideology similar to its own than with a state with rival ideology, because there are fewer points of
contention, ideological language is generally perceived as non-threatening for the states, who agree
with it, and the consequences of conflict are less severe for states who are already committed to the
same values as the unipole.
Second, ideological intensity is of importance, i.e. the extent to which the unipole and the other
states stress the importance of ideology for strategic choice. The intensity may vary from a
minimalist position ascribing little or no value to ideology as a guide for security policy to a
maximalist position arguing that ideology should form the basis of policy choices. The importance
of ideological distance varies with ideological intensity, thereby increasing and decreasing the
effects on state strategy.
Third, the ideological substance of the order promoted by the unipole is important, because the core
values of this order influence the use of positive and negative sanctions likely to be used against
other actors (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005: 21). Two aspects of ideological substance are of
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Convention