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War Makes the State, but Not As It Pleases: Homeland Security and American Anti-Statism
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These examples represent critical cases. If commonly held beliefs are correct and a marked increase in state power has occurred, it will be evident in these cases. If, however, analysis of even these cases reveals minimal lasting change and that full implementation of state building proposals was the exception rather than the rule, the evidence will lend support to our argument.
Following this coding system, we find that, consistent with the war makes the state model, state power has expanded, to some degree, in the United States since September 11, 2001. In one of the seven cases, the USA Patriot Act, there was an expected increase in executive branch authority. However, contrary to expectation, the most striking finding is that resistance to state power far outweighs its expansion in post-9/11 America.
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In
four of the seven cases, proposals to increase state power were restrained, and in two of the seven cases, proposals for the expansion of state power were completely rejected. This finding is consistent with our contention that war provokes attempted expansions of state power, but the degree to which those proposals are successful depends on a state’s institutional receptiveness to state expansion. In the remainder of this section, we will briefly survey these seven cases to demonstrate the relative weakness of American state building since September 11
th
, 2001 and provide a preliminary indication of the primary
sources of domestic restraint.
CASES
CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OF STATE POWER
INSTITUTIONALRESTRAINT
PATRIOT ACT
EXPECTED
NONE
DHS
RESTRAINED
SEPARATION OF POWERS-CONGRESS
TSA
RESTRAINED
SEPARATION OF POWERS-CONGRESS
PRISONER DETENTION
RESTRAINED
SEPARATION OF POWERS-JUDICIARY
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
RESTRAINED
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
CYBER SECURITY
REJECTED
INTEREST GROUP PRESSURE
TIA
REJCTED
SEPARATION OF POWERS-CONGRESS
graphic 1.
Anthony Lewis, “License to Torture,” New York Times, 15 October 2005; Carson Carlson, “IT Warns Against Slippery Slope to Regulation,” E-Week.com, 22 November 2002, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1662335,00.asp; Kate O’Beirne, “Encountering Turbulence: So How Goes the Federal Takeover of Airline Security,” National Review, 17 June 2002; Gail Russell Chaddock, “Security Act to Pervade Daily Lives,” Christian Science Monitor, 21 November 2002; ACLU, “ACLU Criticizes Federal Commission Internal CIA Recommendation; Questions Need for Domestic Intelligence Agency,” 16 December 2002; available at www.aclu.org.
35
See graphic 1.
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| | Authors: Kroenig, Matthew. |
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These examples represent critical cases. If commonly held beliefs are correct and a
marked increase in state power has occurred, it will be evident in these cases. If,
however, analysis of even these cases reveals minimal lasting change and that full
implementation of state building proposals was the exception rather than the rule, the
evidence will lend support to our argument.
Following this coding system, we find that, consistent with the war makes the state
model, state power has expanded, to some degree, in the United States since September
11, 2001. In one of the seven cases, the USA Patriot Act, there was an expected increase
in executive branch authority. However, contrary to expectation, the most striking finding
is that resistance to state power far outweighs its expansion in post-9/11 America.
In
four of the seven cases, proposals to increase state power were restrained, and in two of
the seven cases, proposals for the expansion of state power were completely rejected.
This finding is consistent with our contention that war provokes attempted expansions of
state power, but the degree to which those proposals are successful depends on a state’s
institutional receptiveness to state expansion. In the remainder of this section, we will
briefly survey these seven cases to demonstrate the relative weakness of American state
building since September 11
th
, 2001 and provide a preliminary indication of the primary
sources of domestic restraint.
CASES
CHANGE IN THE LEVEL
OF STATE POWER
INSTITUTIONAL
RESTRAINT
PATRIOT ACT
EXPECTED
NONE
DHS
RESTRAINED
SEPARATION OF POWERS-
CONGRESS
TSA
RESTRAINED
SEPARATION OF POWERS-
CONGRESS
PRISONER
DETENTION
RESTRAINED
SEPARATION OF POWERS-
JUDICIARY
DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE
RESTRAINED
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
CYBER
SECURITY
REJECTED
INTEREST GROUP
PRESSURE
TIA
REJCTED
SEPARATION OF POWERS-
CONGRESS
graphic 1.
Anthony Lewis, “License to Torture,” New York Times, 15 October 2005; Carson Carlson, “IT Warns
Against Slippery Slope to Regulation,” E-Week.com, 22 November 2002,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1662335,00.asp; Kate O’Beirne, “Encountering Turbulence: So
How Goes the Federal Takeover of Airline Security,” National Review, 17 June 2002; Gail Russell
Chaddock, “Security Act to Pervade Daily Lives,” Christian Science Monitor, 21 November 2002; ACLU,
“ACLU Criticizes Federal Commission Internal CIA Recommendation; Questions Need for Domestic
Intelligence Agency,” 16 December 2002; available at www.aclu.org.
35
See graphic 1.
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