 |
ORCON or All Con?: Institutional Impediments to Intelligence Sharing Before and After 9/11
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
Competitive Adaptation Counter-Terrorism Style 29
intelligence investigations.
41
Even more disturbing, over a year before 9/11, a classified
military intelligence program known as Able Danger apparently identified Mohammed
Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, along with al-Mihdhar and al-Hamzi, as members of an al
Qaeda cell operating in New York. When Able Danger members recommended passing
their intelligence to the FBI, lawyers from the Department of Defense allgegedly rejected
their request and the information was not circulated, for fear of sharing military
intelligence gathered on a permanent resident of the United States with a civilian law
enforcement agency.
42
These incidents, along with dozens of other “missed signals” and
“lost opportunities” detailed in separate investigations of the 9/11 attacks by the
Congressional joint intelligence inquiry, the independent 9/11 Commission, and the
Justice Department’s own Inspector General, illustrate the numerous obstacles facing
officials within and across bureaucratic organizations in sharing information, marshaling
resources, and coordinating activities quickly enough to keep track of their terrorist
adversaries.
43
41
Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2003 (declassified), S. Rept. No. 107-351/H. Rept. No. 107-792 (December 2002): 12-16,
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/911rept.pdf
[Accessed 24 December
2003]; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Three 9/11 Hijackers: Identification, Watchlisting, and Tracking, Staff Statement No. 2,
http://www.9-
11commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_2.pdf
[Accessed 11 May 2004]; National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004); U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks (November 2004), redacted and unclassified version (released publicly June 2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0506/final.pdf
[Accessed June 10, 2005]:
289.
42
Douglas Jehl, “Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00,” New York Times (August 9, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/09/politics/09intel.html
[Accessed August 9, 2005]; Dan Eggen, “Sept.
11 Panel Explores Allegations About Atta,” Washington Post (August 12, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/11/AR2005081100684.html
[Accessed
August 12, 2005]; Philip Shenon, “Pentagon Bars Military Officers and Analysts from Testifying,” New York Times (September 21, 2005),
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/
[Accessed January 26, 2006].
43
Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
|
| | Authors: Kenney, Michael. |
|
| |
|
|
Competitive Adaptation Counter-Terrorism Style 29
intelligence investigations.
Even more disturbing, over a year before 9/11, a classified
military intelligence program known as Able Danger apparently identified Mohammed
Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, along with al-Mihdhar and al-Hamzi, as members of an al
Qaeda cell operating in New York. When Able Danger members recommended passing
their intelligence to the FBI, lawyers from the Department of Defense allgegedly rejected
their request and the information was not circulated, for fear of sharing military
intelligence gathered on a permanent resident of the United States with a civilian law
enforcement agency.
These incidents, along with dozens of other “missed signals” and
“lost opportunities” detailed in separate investigations of the 9/11 attacks by the
Congressional joint intelligence inquiry, the independent 9/11 Commission, and the
Justice Department’s own Inspector General, illustrate the numerous obstacles facing
officials within and across bureaucratic organizations in sharing information, marshaling
resources, and coordinating activities quickly enough to keep track of their terrorist
41
Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2003 (declassified), S. Rept. No. 107-351/H. Rept. No. 107-792
(December 2002): 12-16,
[Accessed 24 December
2003]; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Three 9/11 Hijackers:
Identification, Watchlisting, and Tracking, Staff Statement No. 2,
[Accessed 11 May 2004]; National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004);
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence
Information Related to the September 11 Attacks (November 2004), redacted and unclassified version
(released publicly June 2005),
[Accessed June 10, 2005]:
289.
42
Douglas Jehl, “Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00,” New York Times (August 9, 2005),
[Accessed August 9, 2005]; Dan Eggen, “Sept.
11 Panel Explores Allegations About Atta,” Washington Post (August 12, 2005),
August 12, 2005]; Philip Shenon, “Pentagon Bars Military Officers and Analysts from Testifying,” New
York Times (September 21, 2005),
[Accessed January 26, 2006].
43
Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
|
|
 Convention | | Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
