Competitive Adaptation Counter-Terrorism Style 42
leading up to the 9/11 attacks, the CIA failed to share relevant intelligence regarding two
al Qaeda operatives, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hamzi, with the FBI despite the
fact that five agents from the bureau were detailed to the Alex Station, the CIA’s counter-
terrorism unit focusing on al Qaeda. When one of these agents, who read classified CIA
reporting on al Qaeda, requested that the agency pass along information that al-Mihdhar
possessed a valid multiple-entry U.S. visa to the FBI, his request was denied, then
apparently forgotten.
Another FBI detailee to the Alex Station emphasized that there
was a significant amount of animosity from agency employees towards the bureau’s
detailees, and described his arrival to the unit as like “walk[ing] into a buzz saw.”
Cross-agency detailees have also experienced problems in the Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTFs) managed by the FBI. Many non-FBI participants in the JTTFs
essentially serve as liaisons to their home institutions rather than full working partners in
the task forces, limiting their access to FBI information systems, as well as their own
agency’s databases when working at the FBI. For something as simple as running name
traces on suspected terrorists, task force members need approval from FBI headquarters,
which entails navigating their way through unwieldy bureaucratic protocols. While JTTF
members possess top-secret security clearance, they often have poor access to
intelligence information systems, curtailing their ability to draw on these databases in
their investigative work. To access Intelink and other intelligence databases, for
example, members of the New York JTTF must leave their building, cross the street, and
62
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI's Handling of
Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks (November 2004), redacted and unclassified
version (released publicly June 2005),
2005]: 223, 308-309.
63
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI's Handling of
Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks (November 2004), redacted and unclassified
version (released publicly June 2005),
2005]: 223, footnote #159.
Convention