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U.S Defense Transformation: To What and For What?
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accounted for 30 percent of all Federal expenditures, and had over 900 bases, facilities, and properties.
93
In the year 2000, the personnel figures were lower, but the dollar amount was not.
DOD employed just fewer than three million personnel (2,952,000) and had a budget of 291 billion dollars, of which $163.7 billion, or more than half, was spent on RDT&E and procurement, which can be equated directly to jobs.
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There is a strong correlation between the
defense payroll or weapons spending in a state and congressional voting practices. Some member of Congress, expecting their district or state to receive substantial contract awards, request that the contract award announcement be timed to coincide as closely as possible to the congressman’s campaign schedule.
95
Although, not every congressman courts the military and
defense contracts, those who sit on the various armed service committees tend to come from states that have defense contractors concentrated in their district/state.
96
The magnitude of defense spending in the United States and its very tangible benefits
provide legislators with strong incentives to support weapons systems development, especially if the development and acquisition will occur over an extended period. This benefit is magnified if the weapons system will become part of a force structure that is based in the legislator’s state/district. Besides direct compensation to the various states for salaries and wages, DOD provides defense grants to state and local governments, retired military pay, and procurement and research grants. All told, defense spending in 2002 accounted for 16.2 percent of all federal spending. Excluding programs mandated by law, the discretionary budget, defense expenditures in 2002 accounted for almost 61 percent of the federal budget.
97
Given the amount of dollars that
flow out of DOD for weapons systems and forces structure, it is not surprising to find strong legislative support for weapons systems with extend development and fielding times. Those systems that will remain in the inventory for some time.
Predictability
The final factor contributing to the lag of foreign and national security policy behind the
military’s long-term weapons systems development, acquisition, and force structure programs deals with programs that are tangible and predictable as opposed to those that are not. Foreign policy often addresses issues in the humanitarian world. It is more difficult for the foreign policy community to articulate and justify the commitment of resources to a particular humanitarian program when its outcomes in the near term, let alone the far term, are uncertain and difficult to predict and measure. For example, the U.S. intervention in Bosnia to prevent ethnic cleansing, establish peace, and promote democracy continues to be a drain on the nation’s economic and military resources (albeit to a lesser extent now). While public and Congressional support for the Bosnian intervention still exists, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify in terms of national interests and to the electorate as the years go by. Will ethnic tensions erupt when the U.S. led coalition departs? How do we know that it will not, and what measurement tool do we use? When will democracy take hold in Bosnia? If so, what type of democracy? What aspects of civil society must be in place for democracy to prosper? No one can answer these questions with any certainty; there are too many murky variables to predict an outcome.
93
Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy, 137.
94
Cohen, Report of Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress-2000, B-1-2, C-1.
95
Mayer, Elections, Business Cycles, and the Timing of Defense Contract Awards in the United States, 27.
96
James M. Lindsay, “Congress and the Defense Budget: Parochialism or Policy?” in Arms, Politics and
the Economy, ed. Robert Higgs (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1990), 177.
97
U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, DC:
Federal Government, 2002), tables 1-6, 10; U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Indicators: January 2006, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 33.
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| | Authors: Reynolds, Kevin. |
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accounted for 30 percent of all Federal expenditures, and had over 900 bases, facilities, and
properties.
In the year 2000, the personnel figures were lower, but the dollar amount was not.
DOD employed just fewer than three million personnel (2,952,000) and had a budget of 291
billion dollars, of which $163.7 billion, or more than half, was spent on RDT&E and
procurement, which can be equated directly to jobs.
There is a strong correlation between the
defense payroll or weapons spending in a state and congressional voting practices. Some
member of Congress, expecting their district or state to receive substantial contract awards,
request that the contract award announcement be timed to coincide as closely as possible to the
congressman’s campaign schedule.
Although, not every congressman courts the military and
defense contracts, those who sit on the various armed service committees tend to come from
states that have defense contractors concentrated in their district/state.
The magnitude of defense spending in the United States and its very tangible benefits
provide legislators with strong incentives to support weapons systems development, especially if
the development and acquisition will occur over an extended period. This benefit is magnified if
the weapons system will become part of a force structure that is based in the legislator’s
state/district. Besides direct compensation to the various states for salaries and wages, DOD
provides defense grants to state and local governments, retired military pay, and procurement
and research grants. All told, defense spending in 2002 accounted for 16.2 percent of all federal
spending. Excluding programs mandated by law, the discretionary budget, defense expenditures
in 2002 accounted for almost 61 percent of the federal budget.
Given the amount of dollars that
flow out of DOD for weapons systems and forces structure, it is not surprising to find strong
legislative support for weapons systems with extend development and fielding times. Those
systems that will remain in the inventory for some time.
Predictability
The final factor contributing to the lag of foreign and national security policy behind the
military’s long-term weapons systems development, acquisition, and force structure programs
deals with programs that are tangible and predictable as opposed to those that are not. Foreign
policy often addresses issues in the humanitarian world. It is more difficult for the foreign policy
community to articulate and justify the commitment of resources to a particular humanitarian
program when its outcomes in the near term, let alone the far term, are uncertain and difficult to
predict and measure. For example, the U.S. intervention in Bosnia to prevent ethnic cleansing,
establish peace, and promote democracy continues to be a drain on the nation’s economic and
military resources (albeit to a lesser extent now). While public and Congressional support for the
Bosnian intervention still exists, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify in terms of national
interests and to the electorate as the years go by. Will ethnic tensions erupt when the U.S. led
coalition departs? How do we know that it will not, and what measurement tool do we use?
When will democracy take hold in Bosnia? If so, what type of democracy? What aspects of
civil society must be in place for democracy to prosper? No one can answer these questions with
any certainty; there are too many murky variables to predict an outcome.
93
Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy, 137.
94
Cohen, Report of Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress-2000, B-1-2, C-1.
95
Mayer, Elections, Business Cycles, and the Timing of Defense Contract Awards in the United States, 27.
96
James M. Lindsay, “Congress and the Defense Budget: Parochialism or Policy?” in Arms, Politics and
the Economy, ed. Robert Higgs (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1990), 177.
97
U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, DC:
Federal Government, 2002), tables 1-6, 10; U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Economic Indicators:
January 2006, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 33.
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