interests.
When the terrorist attacks occurred on September 11, 2001 the military lacked a
specific plan for operations in Afghanistan. However, the capabilities inherent in the military’s
technology and force structure enable President Bush to commence combat operations in
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 less than a month later.
Within days of the commencement of military operations American airpower employing
a variety of air- and sea-launched precision munitions eliminated the Taliban’s air force, air
defense system, and key communications systems.
Simultaneously, Afghan opposition forces
supported by U.S. SOF teams and close air support launched a ground offensive against the
Taliban and al Qaeda forces. The military used air power and precisions munitions to isolate the
enemy on the battlefield, prevent him from reinforcing his positions, deny him information on
U.S. and allied forces, and ultimately to destroy him.
In December 2001, with the battlefield
isolated and the Northern alliance pressing the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, the U.S. began
deploying U.S. Marines (later Army forces) from the carrier battle groups located in the Indian
Ocean to secure key airheads and lodgment areas in Afghanistan.
In addition to direct combat
operations, the U.S. distributed thousands of tons of medical and food supplies to the Afghan
people. These humanitarian operations were part of a psychological operations campaign to
convince the Afghan people that U.S. combat operations were targeted against the Taliban and al
Qaeda forces, and not the people of Afghanistan.
The military conducted its operations with
dazzling speed. American aircraft operated around the clock. In the space of two years, the
targeting cycle for Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAM’s or cruise missiles) had been
reduced from 101 minutes during operations in Kosovo to 19 minutes in Enduring Freedom
(Afghanistan).
U.S forces moved about the country by air to rapidly close with identified
enemy forces. In less than six months, the Taliban had been removed from power and the al
Qaeda network in Afghanistan had been largely destroyed.
The military’s success in Afghanistan demonstrated its technological superiority and the
influence it had on the nation’s foreign policy. The campaign was fought differently than
previous conflicts. Operations in Afghanistan featured surrogate ground forces, U.S. airpower,
information dominance, and precision munitions.
The unique mix and synchronization of
these elements during the fighting encouraged some observers to categorize the Afghan
operations as a “New American Way of War.”
President Bush was clearly impressed by the
military’s weapons systems and operational prowess. In a December 2001 speech at the Citadel,
President Bush declared, “Afghanistan has been a proving ground for this new approach. These
past two months have shown that an innovative doctrine and high-tech weaponry can shape and
then dominate an unconventional conflict…The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about
the future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums…
When all of our military can continuously locate and track moving targets --with surveillance
from space--warfare will be truly revolutionized.”
Critics of the Bush administration’s
118
Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 20.
119
Ibid. ([cited).
120
Bourne, “Air Delivered Fires in Support of Maneuver.” Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” 7.
121
O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece,” 51.
122
Operation Enduring Freedom ([cited).
123
Ibid. ([cited).
124
O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece,” 50-52, Operation Enduring Freedom ([cited).
125
Donald H Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002): 21-22.
126
Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and The future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy,”
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 2002), 2, [fn3]; Kagan, “War and
Aftermath,” 1.
127
Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” 2.
25
Convention