(Page 30 of 39) - U.S Defense Transformation: To What and For What? authored by Reynolds, Kevin.

military and the Department of Defense appear to be developing a force, which will have
unmatched capabilities for conventional direct combat i.e., killing people, breaking things, and
toppling regimes; but, which are generally ill-suited for low intensity conflict scenarios such as
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation building missions.

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Conclusion

Ideally, the linkages between foreign policy, grand strategy, weapon-system acquisition,

and force structure should be more formalized and synchronized. Greater congressional
oversight of the military’s decision-making concerning the weapon-systems development and
procurement programs coupled with established procedures within and among the various
congressional committees that address foreign policy, national security, and the military would
help reduce the apparent inconsistencies both between within presidential administrations.
Unfortunately, except in times of grave national emergency, the structure of the federal
government and the pluralism inherent in it militate against this type of bi-partisan effort. That is
not to say that “policy lag” cannot be reduced, it can but at the margins. The effort must initially
focus on reforming the laborious Defense Acquisition System (DAS) and the bureaucracy that
administers it. To his credit Secretary Rumsfeld has been trying to do exactly that; however he
has met with only limited success.

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The nature of the bureaucracy, the number of stakeholders

in the process (interest groups, political actions committees, the RDT&E community, etc), and
the political fallout all make defense acquisition reform difficult; especially when the military is
engaged in active combat operations. Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense and the military
must streamline the acquisition process and eliminate/reduce the bureaucratic procedures and
“political pork” associated with fielding new equipment and weapon-systems.

Technologically driven transformation has been and will remain a trademark of the U.S.

Military. Although most of the rhetoric associated with Defense Transformation seems to be
closely linked to Secretary Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration, in reality it is an on going
process that developed exponentially during World War II and was accelerated by the events of
the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War the military’s reliance on technologically advanced
weapon-systems has become even more pronounced; so much so that America’s approach to war
fighting is defined by such technologically arcane terms as “Network Centric Warfare” and
“Effects Based Operations.” The weapon-systems, force structure, and concepts that under grid
the theory of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) represent only one set of military capabilities
available to the nation. However, the military and DoD are not seriously considering other
technologies and force structure options.

Initially combat operations in the Global War On Terrorism further underscored the

military’s affinity for high-tech weapons systems and DoD’s Network Centric approach to war
fighting. Although not without difficulties, the application of America’s technological prowess
during combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq was stunning.

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Currently, all branches of the

military are increasing the acquisition of advanced technologies as they transform to a smaller
NCW capable force. Additionally, the Bush administration is pursuing a very aggressive and

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Burger, What Went Right? ([cited); Kagan, “War and Aftermath”; O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece,”

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Department of Defense, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach (Washington, DC: Department

of Defense, 2003), 6-8.

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Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” 1; Scarborough, “Decisive Force” Now Measured by Speed, Not Troop

Numbers ([cited).