 |
U.S Defense Transformation: To What and For What?
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
Yet, as enabling as the military’s technological capabilities are in one sense, in another
they are debilitating. In many instances, the military can best serve policy in ways other than direct combat. Humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-insurgency, insurgency, and foreign military training (all under the rubric of Military Operations Other Than War [MOOTW]) are operations that require technological systems and force structures different from those needed for high intensity conventional combat. High-tech U.S. combat forces can accomplish both the direct combat and the MOOTW missions, but not simultaneously. MOOTW missions require specialized training. Prolonged employment of high-tech forces in MOOTW missions degrades the combat readiness of the high-tech forces involved. A more robust and technologically diversified force structure with the capability to perform both high and low intensity missions simultaneously would help. However, the military, with the full endorsement of the Bush administration, is transforming into a smaller, faster, more information dominant, and combat capable force.
173
Although this force structure may be superbly equipped
for interstate conflict, in the future the majority of the missions that the U.S. military most likely will perform will be MOOTW missions.
174
Military operations in Somalia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq have shown both the capabilities and limitations of high-technology weapons systems in pursuit of policy objectives.
175
In pursuing a relatively narrow set of technologies such as those encompassed by NCW,
the Department of Defense is excluding other weapon-systems and force structure choices, which may be more relevant to the types of future conflicts the United states is likely to be involved in. If the United States is going to prevail in a Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), or the “Long War” as it is currently be referred to within the military and certain segments of the administration, it will most likely be involved in more Iraq and Afghanistan type scenarios in the future.
176
To sustain the fight the war against a global insurgency will likely require an increase
in ground forces (Army and Marine) as well as the procurement of technologies that will support these forces as they engage in combat operations in urban and close terrain. However, NCW theory and implementing technologies (and the Army’s implementation of it with the Future Combat System [FCS]) are predicate on state-centric and symmetrical warfare with political entities whose war-fighting capabilities resemble those of the United States, albeit less technologically advanced. NCW has not lived up to its billing in Iraq and Afghanistan against insurgents who apply asymmetrical and relatively low-technology devices against U.S. forces with increasing effectiveness. The military and DoD are only now acknowledging that they may be pursuing the wrong technological suite, but have yet to come to grips with overall force structure dilemma and acquiring the forces capable of sustaining the necessary operational tempo to prevail in the “Long War.”
177
In order to mitigate the difficulties of aligning the military’s weapons systems and force
structure acquisitions with national strategy and policy objectives, the military must acquire capabilities which allow it to fight effectively across the full spectrum of conflict. This does not mean the military should prepare for all contingencies equally. Rather, it should weight its capabilities in light of future policies and prioritize the tasks it will most likely have to
173
Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” 11-12, 18-19.
174
Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power.
175
U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Outside
Perspectives, October 21 2003, 1-14.
176
Peter A. Wilson, John Gordon IV, and David E. Johnson, “An Alternative Future Force: Building A
Better Army, Parameters, VOL. XXXIII, No. 4, Winter 2003-04, pp. 28; U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review: February 2006, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 9.
177
Greg Grant, “U.S. Army Shifts R&D to urban Combat Gear,” Defense News, February 27, 2006: 1, 8.
32
|
| | Authors: Reynolds, Kevin. |
|
| |
|
|
Yet, as enabling as the military’s technological capabilities are in one sense, in another
they are debilitating. In many instances, the military can best serve policy in ways other than
direct combat. Humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counter-insurgency,
insurgency, and foreign military training (all under the rubric of Military Operations Other Than
War [MOOTW]) are operations that require technological systems and force structures different
from those needed for high intensity conventional combat. High-tech U.S. combat forces can
accomplish both the direct combat and the MOOTW missions, but not simultaneously.
MOOTW missions require specialized training. Prolonged employment of high-tech forces in
MOOTW missions degrades the combat readiness of the high-tech forces involved. A more
robust and technologically diversified force structure with the capability to perform both high
and low intensity missions simultaneously would help. However, the military, with the full
endorsement of the Bush administration, is transforming into a smaller, faster, more information
dominant, and combat capable force.
Although this force structure may be superbly equipped
for interstate conflict, in the future the majority of the missions that the U.S. military most likely
will perform will be MOOTW missions.
Military operations in Somalia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq have shown both the capabilities and limitations of high-technology
weapons systems in pursuit of policy objectives.
In pursuing a relatively narrow set of technologies such as those encompassed by NCW,
the Department of Defense is excluding other weapon-systems and force structure choices,
which may be more relevant to the types of future conflicts the United states is likely to be
involved in. If the United States is going to prevail in a Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), or
the “Long War” as it is currently be referred to within the military and certain segments of the
administration, it will most likely be involved in more Iraq and Afghanistan type scenarios in the
future.
To sustain the fight the war against a global insurgency will likely require an increase
in ground forces (Army and Marine) as well as the procurement of technologies that will support
these forces as they engage in combat operations in urban and close terrain. However, NCW
theory and implementing technologies (and the Army’s implementation of it with the Future
Combat System [FCS]) are predicate on state-centric and symmetrical warfare with political
entities whose war-fighting capabilities resemble those of the United States, albeit less
technologically advanced. NCW has not lived up to its billing in Iraq and Afghanistan against
insurgents who apply asymmetrical and relatively low-technology devices against U.S. forces
with increasing effectiveness. The military and DoD are only now acknowledging that they may
be pursuing the wrong technological suite, but have yet to come to grips with overall force
structure dilemma and acquiring the forces capable of sustaining the necessary operational tempo
to prevail in the “Long War.”
In order to mitigate the difficulties of aligning the military’s weapons systems and force
structure acquisitions with national strategy and policy objectives, the military must acquire
capabilities which allow it to fight effectively across the full spectrum of conflict. This does not
mean the military should prepare for all contingencies equally. Rather, it should weight its
capabilities in light of future policies and prioritize the tasks it will most likely have to
173
Kagan, “War and Aftermath,” 11-12, 18-19.
174
Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power.
175
U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Outside
Perspectives, October 21 2003, 1-14.
176
Peter A. Wilson, John Gordon IV, and David E. Johnson, “An Alternative Future Force: Building A
Better Army, Parameters, VOL. XXXIII, No. 4, Winter 2003-04, pp. 28; U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial
Defense Review: February 2006, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 9.
177
Greg Grant, “U.S. Army Shifts R&D to urban Combat Gear,” Defense News, February 27, 2006: 1, 8.
32
|
|
 Convention | | All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
