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U.S Defense Transformation: To What and For What?
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policy needs.
6
In 1986, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, contributing authors to the original and
subsequent editions of Makers of Modern Strategy, expressed essentially the same concern:
The actions that will be taken in future crises promise, indeed, to be
predetermined and automatic in nature. One can argue plausibly that the autonomy of the political leadership begins to shrink from the moment that it authorizes the expenditure of national resources on this or that kind of weapons research or the production of this or that kind of bomber, missile, or submarine. Because of the lead time required for the realization of such projects, the decision made today inevitably determines or circumscribes policy at a later date, thus pre-judging situations that have not been foreseen and limiting one’s capabilities for contingencies that have not yet arisen.
7
Weapon system decisions and the force structure they drive are fundamentally political decisions, given the impact they have on near - and short-term policy. Leaving these decisions to the military represents a de facto abdication of important aspects of foreign policy formulation to the military.
Congress and the president often play the services off against one another in the battle
over funds and programs, but they support the military’s technologically-driven weapons systems preferences. The military’s weapons systems selections are almost never challenged. Judith Reppy and Franklin A. Long in the introduction to their anthology The Genesis of New Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D quote Edwin Deagle as saying:
The central political feature of the weapon system acquisition process is that its control inevitably resides mainly in the hand of the services. No one else in the system had the information and the financial and staff resources . . . Moreover, no one can match the unique claim to control of the military requirement process that the wearing of a uniform conveys. Thus, the struggle for civilian influence over the acquisition process will always be uphill. And, given the differences and purposes among the various political constituencies, which surround the Pentagon, civilian involvement will inevitably be diffuse, fragmented, and pluralistic.
8
Both the Executive and Legislative branches of government have been hesitant to challenge the military’s weapon-systems and force structure preferences. Given the scope and breadth of the nation’s needs, neither the president nor any member of congress has the time or inclination to master the technological and operational complexity of modern military operations. Instead, the U.S. civilian leadership relies on the military’s expertise to determine what weapon systems to develop and procure; hence, the pattern and shape of defense transformation and by extension the military’s capabilities in support of future foreign and nation security policy. Although this
6
Michael E.Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program, Edited by Robert J.
Art and Robert Jervis, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992) 27-28; Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, American National Security, 326; Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security, 122.
7
Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert “Reflection on Strategy in the Present and Future,” in Makers of
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age., ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 865.
8
Long and Reppy, The Genesis of New Weapons, 15.
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| | Authors: Reynolds, Kevin. |
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In 1986, Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, contributing authors to the original and
subsequent editions of Makers of Modern Strategy, expressed essentially the same concern:
The actions that will be taken in future crises promise, indeed, to be
predetermined and automatic in nature. One can argue plausibly that the
autonomy of the political leadership begins to shrink from the moment that it
authorizes the expenditure of national resources on this or that kind of weapons
research or the production of this or that kind of bomber, missile, or submarine.
Because of the lead time required for the realization of such projects, the decision
made today inevitably determines or circumscribes policy at a later date, thus pre-
judging situations that have not been foreseen and limiting one’s capabilities for
contingencies that have not yet arisen.
Weapon system decisions and the force structure they drive are fundamentally political
decisions, given the impact they have on near - and short-term policy. Leaving these decisions to
the military represents a de facto abdication of important aspects of foreign policy formulation to
the military.
Congress and the president often play the services off against one another in the battle
over funds and programs, but they support the military’s technologically-driven weapons
systems preferences. The military’s weapons systems selections are almost never challenged.
Judith Reppy and Franklin A. Long in the introduction to their anthology The Genesis of New
Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D quote Edwin Deagle as saying:
The central political feature of the weapon system acquisition process is that its
control inevitably resides mainly in the hand of the services. No one else in the
system had the information and the financial and staff resources . . . Moreover, no
one can match the unique claim to control of the military requirement process that
the wearing of a uniform conveys. Thus, the struggle for civilian influence over
the acquisition process will always be uphill. And, given the differences and
purposes among the various political constituencies, which surround the
Pentagon, civilian involvement will inevitably be diffuse, fragmented, and
pluralistic.
Both the Executive and Legislative branches of government have been hesitant to challenge the
military’s weapon-systems and force structure preferences. Given the scope and breadth of the
nation’s needs, neither the president nor any member of congress has the time or inclination to
master the technological and operational complexity of modern military operations. Instead, the
U.S. civilian leadership relies on the military’s expertise to determine what weapon systems to
develop and procure; hence, the pattern and shape of defense transformation and by extension
the military’s capabilities in support of future foreign and nation security policy. Although this
6
Michael E.Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program, Edited by Robert J.
Art and Robert Jervis, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992) 27-28; Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr,
American National Security, 326; Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security, 122.
7
Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert “Reflection on Strategy in the Present and Future,” in Makers of
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age., ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986), 865.
8
Long and Reppy, The Genesis of New Weapons, 15.
4
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