 |
U.S Defense Transformation: To What and For What?
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
was previously identified as “policy lag.”
30
While presidents often tinker with military force
structure by adding to or taking from it incrementally, for the most part they tend to make do with the force structure they inherit.
The development of the B-1 illustrates how problematic it is to expect the military’s
current weapons systems decisions for acquisitions 20 years in the future to actually support the foreign and national security policies of the nation’s future political leaders. When the B-1 bomber was finally fielded policy had changed and the weapon system was obsolete. The conceptual development of the B-1 bomber began in 1961 with the B-70 bomber as part of the Air Force’s Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft program (AMSA). This program was designed to meet the perceived need by the Air Force to acquire a bomber capable of penetrating Soviet air space undetected at low or high level. Begun under the Kennedy administration, the B-1’s development continued through the Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations.
31
The
B-1 finally entered the Air Force’s inventory in 1986.
32
Over the course of the B-1’s
development, America’s foreign policy orientation changed four times. Flexible Response gave way to Nixon’s policy of Détente, then Carter’s accommodation under a theory of complex interdependency, and finally Reagan’s policy of global confrontation with the Soviet Union.
33
In
fact, in 1977 the Carter administration cancelled the B-1 after over $22.9 billion had been spent on its research and development.
34
But, like the mythical phoenix, the B-1 rose from its own
ashes during the early years of the of the Reagan presidency and by the mid-1980s it entered the Air Force’s inventory.
When Reagan became president, the U.S. began a massive rearmament. The Air Force
revived the B-1 program, although four years had been lost on its development, and by 1982-1983, three years before the B-1’s fielding, its utility was questioned in light of the B-2 stealth bomber, which the Air Force had been developing in secret and concurrently with the B-1.
35
Moreover, by the time the Air Force began fielding the B-1, the Cold War had begun to thaw as Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced a policy of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) and the Reagan administration began to cooperate with the Soviet Union on further limiting strategic weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament.
36
By the time the last B-
1 bomber wing was operational, the Cold War had ended and the B-2 bomber had replaced it on grounds of technological superiority. The story of its acquisition is as much a testament to the military’s acknowledged expertise, autonomy, and the strength of its political alliances as it is an indictment of the lack of coordination between weapon system development and national
30
In another sense weapons systems can be said to lag behind policy. For example, foreign policy options
may require a force structure with certain capabilities that weapons systems in the inventory cannot provide. Research and development begins now when they are needed, but due to the time involved in their development, they are not fielded for 10 to 15 years. Foreign policy may have changed several times in the period between concept development and fielding, and these weapons systems may not support a future administration’s policy needs.
31
Nick Koltz, Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics, and the B-1 Bomber (New York: Pantheon Books, A
Division of Random House, Inc., 1988), 59-65.
32
Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program, eds. Robert J. Art
and Robert Jervis, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), 44, 88, 236-238.
33
Jerel A. Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
College Publishers, 1993), 17.
34
Brown, Flying Blind, 264
.
35
Brown, Flying Blind, 294-98; Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, American National Security, 84-85; Ethan
Barnaby Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), passim.
36
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 796-97.
8
|
| | Authors: Reynolds, Kevin. |
|
| |
|
|
was previously identified as “policy lag.”
While presidents often tinker with military force
structure by adding to or taking from it incrementally, for the most part they tend to make do
with the force structure they inherit.
The development of the B-1 illustrates how problematic it is to expect the military’s
current weapons systems decisions for acquisitions 20 years in the future to actually support the
foreign and national security policies of the nation’s future political leaders. When the B-1
bomber was finally fielded policy had changed and the weapon system was obsolete. The
conceptual development of the B-1 bomber began in 1961 with the B-70 bomber as part of the
Air Force’s Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft program (AMSA). This program was designed
to meet the perceived need by the Air Force to acquire a bomber capable of penetrating Soviet
air space undetected at low or high level. Begun under the Kennedy administration, the B-1’s
development continued through the Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations.
B-1 finally entered the Air Force’s inventory in 1986.
Over the course of the B-1’s
development, America’s foreign policy orientation changed four times. Flexible Response gave
way to Nixon’s policy of Détente, then Carter’s accommodation under a theory of complex
interdependency, and finally Reagan’s policy of global confrontation with the Soviet Union.
fact, in 1977 the Carter administration cancelled the B-1 after over $22.9 billion had been spent
on its research and development.
But, like the mythical phoenix, the B-1 rose from its own
ashes during the early years of the of the Reagan presidency and by the mid-1980s it entered the
Air Force’s inventory.
When Reagan became president, the U.S. began a massive rearmament. The Air Force
revived the B-1 program, although four years had been lost on its development, and by 1982-
1983, three years before the B-1’s fielding, its utility was questioned in light of the B-2 stealth
bomber, which the Air Force had been developing in secret and concurrently with the B-1.
Moreover, by the time the Air Force began fielding the B-1, the Cold War had begun to thaw as
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced a policy of glasnost (openness) and perestroika
(restructuring) and the Reagan administration began to cooperate with the Soviet Union on
further limiting strategic weapons and promoting nuclear disarmament.
1 bomber wing was operational, the Cold War had ended and the B-2 bomber had replaced it on
grounds of technological superiority. The story of its acquisition is as much a testament to the
military’s acknowledged expertise, autonomy, and the strength of its political alliances as it is an
indictment of the lack of coordination between weapon system development and national
30
In another sense weapons systems can be said to lag behind policy. For example, foreign policy options
may require a force structure with certain capabilities that weapons systems in the inventory cannot provide.
Research and development begins now when they are needed, but due to the time involved in their development,
they are not fielded for 10 to 15 years. Foreign policy may have changed several times in the period between
concept development and fielding, and these weapons systems may not support a future administration’s policy
needs.
31
Nick Koltz, Wild Blue Yonder: Money, Politics, and the B-1 Bomber (New York: Pantheon Books, A
Division of Random House, Inc., 1988), 59-65.
32
Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program, eds. Robert J. Art
and Robert Jervis, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), 44, 88,
236-238.
33
Jerel A. Rosati, The Politics of United States Foreign Policy (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
College Publishers, 1993), 17.
34
Brown, Flying Blind, 264
.
35
Brown, Flying Blind, 294-98; Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, American National Security, 84-85; Ethan
Barnaby Kapstein, The Political Economy of National Security (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press,
1992), passim.
36
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 796-97.
8
|
|
 Convention | | Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
