14
The right to organize and exist on the Romanian and Slovak political scenes is nevertheless
just a first step in understanding the political clout of the Hungarian parties. Their position was
further consolidated by the electoral system, since the choice of list proportional representation
(PR) systems in both Romania and Slovakia gave Hungarian parties the possibility to be elected
to parliament and to become actual players in the democratic political game. In Romania, debates
surrounded the choice of electoral system, with an original version sponsored by the FSN calling
for single member-districts (SMD) and 15 reserved seats for the military. All smaller parties
came together strongly in favor of proportional representation as the more democratic and
representative option and also the most likely to insure better parliamentary representation for
these parties. Eventually, a compromise was reached providing for a list PR system, no reserved
seats and for the direct election of the president, concurrently with parliamentary elections. The
FSN’s willingness to relinquish the advantageous SMD proposal, and accept the PR system,
which favored the opposition and the UDMR, was based on the calculation that a nationally-
elected president would carry the party in the legislature as well.
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As a result of these strategic
calculations of Romanian parties, the mobilized and well-coordinated Hungarian minority was
able to elect their party’s candidates in several of the 42 multi-member districts, all of them
situated in Transylvania. With an average national district magnitude of 8, the relatively large
number of seats available in each district further contributed to a better electoral showing by the
UDMR.
32
In Slovakia, Law 50 of the Slovak National Council from March 16, 1990 provided in its first
article that “elections to the Slovak National Council are held on the basis of universal, equal and
direct suffrage by secret ballot, in accordance with the principle of proportional representation in
constituencies.” However, the use of PR was repeatedly called into question by the governing
party, especially after the 1994 elections. Mečiar frequently expressed his preference for a single
member district system that would “stabilize the party system and prevent further
fragmentation.”
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Nevertheless, the opposition as well as small governmental coalition parties
such as the SNS and ZRS came together in an unlikely coalition to prevent such changes.
Furthermore, the Slovak territory was divided in four large electoral districts, the high number of
seats available in each district raising the chances of small parties, Hungarian parties included, to
gains seats.
Another procedural factor conducive to positive electoral outcomes for Hungarian parties
Convention