complex processes of transformation. "Continuity" and "change" then cease to denote alternative
stories about foreign policy but constitute analytical moments we need to take into account in
order to understand how processes of transformation work under the condition the continuity
and change take place at the same time. In contrast to a strategy of comparative statics, which
conceives of change as the realization of distinct, synchronic values of a particular variable over
time, we conceptualize processes of transformation as instances of the similarity or coincidence
of continuity and change. Even in the hypothetical extreme case of a mere continuation of
established routines, these very routines need to stand a test of practice anew, in the light of new
experiences. Similarly, at the other extreme, situations of radical change can hardly be conceived
as complete tabula rasa situation so that traces of continuity can be found. The focus of interest is
then not whether there is continuity or change but rather how the new emerges from the old.
Routines that are transformed are thus not abolished, but rather aufgehoben.
processes of transformation does not entail any presupposition as to whether German foreign
policy is characterized by continuity rather than change. The key challenge is then to find
methodologically sound starting points for the reconstruction of such processes of
transformation precisely because they are historically open.
Social constructivist analyses of German foreign policy, which assume the mutual
constitution of structure and agency, have emphasized this very compatibility of historical
contingency and the possibility for methodologically controlled research (cf. Risse 1999: 36). The
common point of reference of these studies has been the basic formulation of social
constructivism by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. Interestingly, Jürgen Habermas has
criticized Berger and Luckmann for systematically privileging causal mechanisms that preserve
pre-existing structures. The social constructivist theory of action, according to Habermas,
operates with a narrow culturalist concept of lifeworld. Hence,
participants actualize specific background belief that are taken from the reservoir of cultural
knowledge; the process of deliberation/understanding serves to negotiate common definitions of
the situation, which need to live up to the requirements of a consent that is accepted as justified.
The cultural knowledge thus undergoes a test, it need to be capable of coping with 'the world',
with facts, norms, and experiences. Revisions have indirect effects on the background knowledge
that is not subject to debate, insofar as they are internally linked to the problematic aspects. From
such a perspective communicative action presents itself as an interpretive mechanism through
which cultural knowledge is reproduced. The reproduction of the lifeworld basically consists of a
3
A verb which German philosophers (most prominently Hegel) have found quite attractive for it has the
threefold connotation: to preserve, to overcome, and to elevate to a higher stage.
9
Convention