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NATO Encounters the Broader Middle East: Will the Atlantic Alliance Survive, and if so, How?
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December 2001. In August 2003 NATO took permanent lead of the ISAF headquarters and subsequently became increasingly involved in the reconstruction efforts outside the capital of Kabul. In June 2004, the NATO heads of state thus declared that “Contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan is NATO’s key priority” (NATO Ist Summit Comm, 2004, paragraph 4). Through 2005 the allies decided to expand its reconstruction to all of Afghanistan, including the southern region where the American-led coalition still operates in its hunt for Taleban and Al Qaeda forces (Operation Enduring Freedom). Simultaneously to declaring Afghanistan the Alliance’s key priority, NATO reached agreement to undertake a limited but still formal engagement in Iraq that concerns the training of military officers notably via a military academy in Baghdad, the Training, Doctrine, and Education Centre (TDEC).
This decision to formally engage in Iraq could not had been made had all allies not been exasperated with the recent tensions and divisions but it was notably made possible by developments that met all the conditions set by the skeptical allies, notably France. These developments concerned the growing insurgency and the wish by the United States to have allies shoulder some of the stabilization burden. This wish was expressed notably in the spring of 2004 in the context of the Polish-led division and regional security zone in Iraq that the United States hoped to see gain greater NATO support. It soon became apparent that NATO’s support would be forthcoming only if three conditions were met (Rynning 2005, 142): if a legitimate Iraqi government requested NATO’s assistance; if the UN supported the assistance; and if NATO and not the United States were in command of the operation. By June 2004 all three conditions were met and NATO’s engagement began. However, the agreement was sparse and not all allies wished to support the NATO missions; instead, some contribute to the training of Iraqi security personnel on a bilateral level and at locations outside Iraq.
8
NATO has therefore organized an elaborate mechanism
for coordinating the various national and collective initiatives with the Iraqi authorities.
9
A contentious debate on the elements of justice and legitimacy accounts for the limited nature of the Iraqi engagement and also the process of diplomatic compromise of 2004 that enabled the framework programs mentioned above but which also reveals the persistence of disagreement on the level of policy goals. The US proposal for a “Greater Middle East” – that came into being in the fall of 2003 and was tabled in early 2004 in the context of the US presidency of the G8 that concluded in June 2004 – was criticized by allies for subsuming a large and heterogeneous region under an agenda dominated by America’s interest in the war on terror and America’s conception of democracy. Moreover, allies worried that the plan would seek to impose democracy from the outside, provoking disorder and greater radicalism, and they criticized the American blueprint for ignoring the Israel-Palestine question. In short, the criticism was that too little consideration was paid to legitimacy – the interests of individual countries in the region – and too much to the overriding quest for justice in the war on terror. The BMENA program that did come out of the American G8 presidency represents a compromise but it has not erased this underlying difference.
Contentiousness is also a characteristic of the allied debate on the use of force. The Iraq war of 2003 was made with reference to the principle of preemptive defense enunciated by the W. Bush
8
Twelve allies contributed to the first Training Mission in 2005: the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Turkey, Denmark, Canada, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland. The allies that did not participate were thus in a majority – fourteen: France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Iceland, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
9
NATO has a Training and Equipment Coordination Group (NTECG) which involves people at the headquarters in
Brussels as well as at the Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation. The NTECG goes through a Training and Equipment Synchronization Cell (TESC) to connect to the Training and Equipment Coordination Committee (TECC) headed by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
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13
December 2001. In August 2003 NATO took permanent lead of the ISAF headquarters and
subsequently became increasingly involved in the reconstruction efforts outside the capital of
Kabul. In June 2004, the NATO heads of state thus declared that “Contributing to peace and
stability in Afghanistan is NATO’s key priority” (NATO Ist Summit Comm, 2004, paragraph 4).
Through 2005 the allies decided to expand its reconstruction to all of Afghanistan, including the
southern region where the American-led coalition still operates in its hunt for Taleban and Al Qaeda
forces (Operation Enduring Freedom). Simultaneously to declaring Afghanistan the Alliance’s key
priority, NATO reached agreement to undertake a limited but still formal engagement in Iraq that
concerns the training of military officers notably via a military academy in Baghdad, the Training,
Doctrine, and Education Centre (TDEC).
This decision to formally engage in Iraq could not had been made had all allies not been
exasperated with the recent tensions and divisions but it was notably made possible by
developments that met all the conditions set by the skeptical allies, notably France. These
developments concerned the growing insurgency and the wish by the United States to have allies
shoulder some of the stabilization burden. This wish was expressed notably in the spring of 2004 in
the context of the Polish-led division and regional security zone in Iraq that the United States hoped
to see gain greater NATO support. It soon became apparent that NATO’s support would be
forthcoming only if three conditions were met (Rynning 2005, 142): if a legitimate Iraqi
government requested NATO’s assistance; if the UN supported the assistance; and if NATO and not
the United States were in command of the operation. By June 2004 all three conditions were met
and NATO’s engagement began. However, the agreement was sparse and not all allies wished to
support the NATO missions; instead, some contribute to the training of Iraqi security personnel on a
bilateral level and at locations outside Iraq.
8
NATO has therefore organized an elaborate mechanism
for coordinating the various national and collective initiatives with the Iraqi authorities.
9
A contentious debate on the elements of justice and legitimacy accounts for the limited nature of the
Iraqi engagement and also the process of diplomatic compromise of 2004 that enabled the
framework programs mentioned above but which also reveals the persistence of disagreement on
the level of policy goals. The US proposal for a “Greater Middle East” – that came into being in the
fall of 2003 and was tabled in early 2004 in the context of the US presidency of the G8 that
concluded in June 2004 – was criticized by allies for subsuming a large and heterogeneous region
under an agenda dominated by America’s interest in the war on terror and America’s conception of
democracy. Moreover, allies worried that the plan would seek to impose democracy from the
outside, provoking disorder and greater radicalism, and they criticized the American blueprint for
ignoring the Israel-Palestine question. In short, the criticism was that too little consideration was
paid to legitimacy – the interests of individual countries in the region – and too much to the
overriding quest for justice in the war on terror. The BMENA program that did come out of the
American G8 presidency represents a compromise but it has not erased this underlying difference.
Contentiousness is also a characteristic of the allied debate on the use of force. The Iraq war of
2003 was made with reference to the principle of preemptive defense enunciated by the W. Bush
8
Twelve allies contributed to the first Training Mission in 2005: the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Turkey, Denmark, Canada, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland. The allies that did
not participate were thus in a majority – fourteen: France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Iceland, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
9
NATO has a Training and Equipment Coordination Group (NTECG) which involves people at the headquarters in
Brussels as well as at the Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation. The NTECG goes through
a Training and Equipment Synchronization Cell (TESC) to connect to the Training and Equipment Coordination
Committee (TECC) headed by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
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