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NATO Encounters the Broader Middle East: Will the Atlantic Alliance Survive, and if so, How?
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upon their failure and the crisis in relations between France and Great Britain and the Arab world following the botched Suez intervention in 1956, undertook to delineate NATO from the region and handle Middle Eastern affairs on a separate and mostly national track. The case demonstrates that NATO had no integrated vision of the Middle East. Pluralism applied to the “free world” but it became understood that the United States, the leader, defined the limits of pluralism. Anti-pluralism was equated with anti-communism, which was a clear policy but also one that neglected the aspirations of the have-nots, the Arab regimes.
The North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 6 defines NATO’s area of operation as essentially the national territories and then assets in either the Mediterranean or the North Atlantic. The Mediterranean dimension was contentious in light of the “Atlantic” nature of the pact: most allies in 1949 did not wish for this dimension but they had to reckon with the vulnerable southern flank, and also with the wishes of the United States, the indispensable leader. The United States did focus on the Mediterranean: after all, it had brought in the Sixth Fleet to support the Truman doctrine of 1947, it later wanted to supply Europe with oil from the Middle East (the United States was self-sufficient at this time), and NATO was notoriously short of manpower in these early years. In Washington the balanced tipped in favor of Italy being included as a founding NATO member whereas Greece and Turkey had to await 1952 before conditions were ripe for membership (Timothy Smith 1985). France seized on the momentum in Washington to enhance the Mediterranean dimension of the Alliance and managed to secure the inclusion of its Algerian departments in Article 6 (Acheson 1989, 279; Kaplan 1995, 31).
NATO thus gained a Mediterranean dimension that brought it into contact with the Middle East. Initially, there was no discussion of formalizing NATO’s role in relation to this region; already, the Mediterranean dimension was difficult to handle. US policy-makers were drawn into a dilemma, however (see Hahn 1991, 88-89). The Middle East was the gateway to three continents – Africa, Asia, and Europe – and thus the key to NATO’s southern flank, and the ideal solution, from a US perspective, of maintaining Britain as the leading power in the region was problematic: Britain’s power was waning and its continued imperial presence could provoke radical Arab nationalism, in turn enabling communist influence and renewed war with Israel.
In the end the United States had to abandon the balancing act between supporting Britain and encouraging Arab moderation, and the result was the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957 (the United States would use force to protect Middle Eastern governments against communist aggression) and the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958. This end point was reached through considerable diplomatic turbulence, involving the Suez crisis of 1956 but also the sustained attempt to tie NATO to a Middle Eastern defense organization. The starting point was the tripartite declaration of the United States, Great Britain, and France of 25 May 1950. In this declaration, the three great powers promised to deliver arms only to Middle Eastern states renouncing plans of aggression, and they promised they “would immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent” aggression.
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson later wrote that the origins of this in principle far-reaching declaration are “not easy to explain” (1989, 396) – “The available records do not help” – but the lack of explanation must be a matter of convenience because Acheson was intimately involved in the diplomacy to get a regional defense pact off the ground.
2
Britain was leading this effort, given
its interests and presence in the region, and given its realization that it lacked the means to counter
2
One observer notes that US support for the tripartite declaration (which included Israel) emerged from domestic US
support for Israel (Hahn 1991, 100) – and it was difficult to see how it squared with the US policy of avoiding military commitments in the region. This may account for Acheson’s poor memory on the issue.
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5
upon their failure and the crisis in relations between France and Great Britain and the Arab world
following the botched Suez intervention in 1956, undertook to delineate NATO from the region and
handle Middle Eastern affairs on a separate and mostly national track. The case demonstrates that
NATO had no integrated vision of the Middle East. Pluralism applied to the “free world” but it
became understood that the United States, the leader, defined the limits of pluralism. Anti-pluralism
was equated with anti-communism, which was a clear policy but also one that neglected the
aspirations of the have-nots, the Arab regimes.
The North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 6 defines NATO’s area of operation as essentially the national
territories and then assets in either the Mediterranean or the North Atlantic. The Mediterranean
dimension was contentious in light of the “Atlantic” nature of the pact: most allies in 1949 did not
wish for this dimension but they had to reckon with the vulnerable southern flank, and also with the
wishes of the United States, the indispensable leader. The United States did focus on the
Mediterranean: after all, it had brought in the Sixth Fleet to support the Truman doctrine of 1947, it
later wanted to supply Europe with oil from the Middle East (the United States was self-sufficient at
this time), and NATO was notoriously short of manpower in these early years. In Washington the
balanced tipped in favor of Italy being included as a founding NATO member whereas Greece and
Turkey had to await 1952 before conditions were ripe for membership (Timothy Smith 1985).
France seized on the momentum in Washington to enhance the Mediterranean dimension of the
Alliance and managed to secure the inclusion of its Algerian departments in Article 6 (Acheson
1989, 279; Kaplan 1995, 31).
NATO thus gained a Mediterranean dimension that brought it into contact with the Middle East.
Initially, there was no discussion of formalizing NATO’s role in relation to this region; already, the
Mediterranean dimension was difficult to handle. US policy-makers were drawn into a dilemma,
however (see Hahn 1991, 88-89). The Middle East was the gateway to three continents – Africa,
Asia, and Europe – and thus the key to NATO’s southern flank, and the ideal solution, from a US
perspective, of maintaining Britain as the leading power in the region was problematic: Britain’s
power was waning and its continued imperial presence could provoke radical Arab nationalism, in
turn enabling communist influence and renewed war with Israel.
In the end the United States had to abandon the balancing act between supporting Britain and
encouraging Arab moderation, and the result was the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957 (the United
States would use force to protect Middle Eastern governments against communist aggression) and
the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958. This end point was reached through considerable
diplomatic turbulence, involving the Suez crisis of 1956 but also the sustained attempt to tie NATO
to a Middle Eastern defense organization. The starting point was the tripartite declaration of the
United States, Great Britain, and France of 25 May 1950. In this declaration, the three great powers
promised to deliver arms only to Middle Eastern states renouncing plans of aggression, and they
promised they “would immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to
prevent” aggression.
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson later wrote that the origins of this in principle far-reaching
declaration are “not easy to explain” (1989, 396) – “The available records do not help” – but the
lack of explanation must be a matter of convenience because Acheson was intimately involved in
the diplomacy to get a regional defense pact off the ground.
2
Britain was leading this effort, given
its interests and presence in the region, and given its realization that it lacked the means to counter
2
One observer notes that US support for the tripartite declaration (which included Israel) emerged from domestic US
support for Israel (Hahn 1991, 100) – and it was difficult to see how it squared with the US policy of avoiding military
commitments in the region. This may account for Acheson’s poor memory on the issue.
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